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ABSTRACT 
 
JIMMY CARTER’S POST-PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC: 
FAITH-BASED RHETORIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOREIGN POLICY 
by Daniel Eric Schabot. 
 
August 2012 
 
 Former President James Earl Carter is well known for his rhetorical efforts to 
promote human rights. Carter’s human rights advocacy is motivated and sustained by his 
belief that God duty-bounds him to assist those less fortunate than himself. Scholars 
generally concede, however, that as president, Jimmy Carter’s human rights 
accomplishments were minimal and that he failed to develop or institute consistent 
policies. This dissertation compares and contrasts Carter’s presidency and post-
presidency with respect to human rights accomplishments, arguing that he was better able 
to serve an advocacy role when out of office. Carter, free of separation of church and 
state restraints, successfully pursued human rights advocacy world-wide. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Carter and Religious Faith 
 President James (Jimmy) Earl Carter is a professed born again Christian. While 
running for president in 1976 Carter stated, “I can be a better President because of my 
faith” (Hahn, 1980, p. 61). Years after his presidency, in the book Living Faith (1996) 
(where he catalogues several of his faith-based actions and philosophies), he notes that, 
“… the religious beliefs I inherited have been transformed into a living faith” (p. 3). As a 
born again Christian, Carter’s faith is the belief that Jesus Christ is his lord and savior. 
Carter used his life to create a living faith that promoted the teachings of Christ. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Carter’s use of faith-based rhetoric 
to support human rights goals following his departure from public office. I contend that 
presidential politics and the presidency placed limits on Carter’s ability to discuss his 
faith as a basis for his human rights advocacy. I will explain as well how Carter used his 
faith to advocate human rights goals after he left office. I begin with a literature review of 
Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric and human rights rhetoric, and in so doing justify a 
need for the study of Carter’s post-presidential faith-based rhetoric. 
Post-Presidential Rhetoric 
 Former presidents do more than hock their memoirs. The political functions of 
former presidents change as their lives extend. Due to his active interest in geopolitical 
affairs and philanthropic endeavors, Jimmy Carter has significantly impacted the way the 
activities of former presidents are viewed. Carter is unique among former presidents. His 
decision to pursue political interests provides considerable data suited to rhetorical 
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analysis. Specifically, Carter’s post-presidential foreign policy efforts presented 
significant data suited to faith-based rhetorical criticism.  
 Carter clearly establishes a model of both national and international public service 
for ex-presidents. Carter (in Walsh, Reese, Sawicki, Graham, & Omestad, 2005) contends 
that “when I left office in, I was in a quandary, I was 56 years old, and I knew I had a life 
expectancy of 25 years or more. I began to wonder what Rosalynn [his wife] and I could 
do in the international world” (p. 61). Walsh et al. (2005) contended that Bill Clinton is 
following a similar path. Only five years after his presidency, an unidentified confidant of 
Clinton’s noted that (in Walsh et al, 2005) “He doesn’t think in terms of ‘I’m going to 
pioneer a new way to have a post-presidency…’ He wants to make a difference (p. 60).” 
Even the self-proclaimed out of politics George H. W. Bush quietly worked for charitable 
causes with Clinton (Walsh et al., 2005).  
 In the United States, the presidency holds unique significance. Numerous 
accounts attempt to explain the power that the president holds over American culture. 
Stuckey (2004) offers an extended study of how United States Presidents incorporate 
cultural values into their rhetoric and define cultural values. That power allows the 
president to use and wield a wide variety of rhetorical strategies. The office of the 
president also conveys with it considerable ethos. The press, for example, pays attention 
to what former presidents say. Ex-presidents have the power to garner press attention as 
shown by a Fox News Corporations interview with Bill Clinton (the text of the interview 
can be found in Wallace, 2006). Clinton made arguments supporting previous policy 
decisions and explained his philanthropic organization’s mission (Wallace, 2006). 
Former presidents frequently make themselves available to the media.  
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 Unfortunately, very little is found in the communication literature regarding post-
presidential rhetoric. One published scholarly study specifically examined post-
presidential rhetoric and its implications. It analyzes Herbert Hoover’s speaking 
campaign against the New Deal in 1934-1936 (Short, 1991). Short notes that after losing 
his re-election bid in 1932, Hoover did very little until 1934, when he inaugurated an 
ideological campaign against the New Deal. Hoover used radio and live speaking 
engagements to effectively change his image from a bumbling ex-president to a 
presidential peer of Franklin Roosevelt. 
 Beyond recreating his own image, Hoover was able to clearly develop several 
argumentative positions against the New Deal. The first theme developed by Hoover was 
the protection of “American Values” (Short, 1991, p. 338). Hoover argued that the 
totalitarian trends in Europe developed out of big government policies like the New Deal. 
Freedom and liberty in the United States were inexorably linked to Christian faith, which 
was being threatened by the New Deal. The second theme was that of fiscal 
responsibility. Hoover focused on both the New Deal’s impact on government spending 
and the individual’s lack of fiscal responsibility. Hoover claimed that the “New Deal” 
destroyed self-reliance and Christianity because fiscal responsibility is a key Christian 
principle. Next, Hoover proclaimed that rejection of the New Deal would save America’s 
morality. This was similar to Hoover’s first theme; he claimed that big government 
policies would result in moral destruction. Hoover effected some political change with 
his thematic arguments shifting the debate about the New Deal in the press from a debate 
about results to a debate about ideology.  
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 Short (1991) contends that Hoover was the only person in the country that could 
address United States policy as a presidential peer. A second political advantage is that an 
ex-president, even though his popularity may have waned, has proven constituency. This 
gave him a unique ethos and opportunity to address important topics.  
 Lee (1995b) examines two of Carters’ autobiographical works, Keeping Faith and 
Turning Point. He argues that Carter used these works to change his political legacy. Lee 
contends that “time does not assure the Truth (sic) of public memory; it merely records 
results” (p. 121). Carter used time to change the perception of his record. Through his 
post-presidential writing, Carter depicted himself as simply a humble public servant. 
 Carter’s humility fit with his idea of Christian virtue (Lee, 1995b). Repentant 
Christians, for example, ask forgiveness for their sins by humbling themselves before 
God. Humility is needed to access the goodness of God. Therefore, “humility is a 
qualification for acquiring (the) other virtues” (Lee, 1995b, p. 123). Lee (1995b) claims 
that by humbling himself before “the people” Carter developed a similar relationship (p. 
123). To show his virtuousness he cast himself as working for the nation’s citizenry. 
Similarly, in order to demonstrate to commentators that the country was virtuous he 
crafted a humble foreign policy. Carter’s foreign policy was humble because he placed 
faith-based values before popular will. Lee (1995b) notes that “for Carter, serving the 
‘public good’ is calibrated in political courage and not political support” (p. 126). 
Carter’s post-presidential writing, I argue here, helped reshape his image from a lack-
luster president to a faith-driven servant. Lee (1995b) concludes that Carter’s work in 
international affairs also demonstrated a public servant ethos.  
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 Despite the fact that there are few studies of Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric, 
three books chronicle Carter’s actions following his presidency (Brinkley, 1998; 
Skidmore, 2004; Updergrove, 2006). Skidmore (2004) contends that Carter reinvented 
himself and has contributed more to his country after his presidency than all but two or 
three other ex-presidents. Brinkley (1998) chronicles Carter’s post-presidential acts in 
detail from the years 1981 through 1997. 
 Carter wrote several bestselling books, monitored elections worldwide, built 
Habitat for Humanity houses, and gave numerous speeches. Despite all of those 
activities, no major study of Jimmy Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric has been 
conducted. Writers that have chronicled the works of Carter’s post-presidency concur that 
Carter’s reputation has improved (Brinkley, 1998; Skidmore, 2004; Updergrove, 2006). 
Smith (2000) asserts that “Jimmy Carter used his years after the White House to refurbish 
his historical reputation through good works at home and abroad” (p. 189). While Carter 
has his critics, the response to his work has been favorable, including a Nobel Peace Prize 
and several other awards.  
Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric should be studied to develop a genre of faith-
based post-presidential rhetoric. One potential result may include Carter’s use of religious 
interpretations of the Bible to support his post-presidential goals and initiatives. 
Knowledge of both would help rhetorical critics to better analyze post-presidential 
rhetoric. A major theme of both Carter’s presidency and post-presidency was human 
rights. Examining his human rights rhetoric, I contend, reveals a unique shift in Carter’s 
post-presidential rhetoric. The following section explores Carter’s human rights rhetoric. 
  
6 
Human Rights Foreign Policy 
 Human-rights-centered foreign policy marked Carter’s presidency (for detailed 
accounts see Carter, 1982; Forsythe, 2002; Kramer, 2005, Schmitz & Walker, 2004; 
Shestack, 1989; Stohl, Carleton, & Johnson, 1984; Stuckey, 2008). Carter used speech 
making to promote human rights (Forsythe & Beatham, 1995). Carter emphasized his 
credibility and faith-based beliefs. A focus on human rights was an extension of his 
personality-based politics (Stuckey, 2008). To explain why human rights foreign policy 
rhetoric is important to the study of Carter’s post presidency, this section examines 
Carter’s foreign policy philosophies, their impact on human rights, and his failure to 
implement them. 
 Forsythe (2002) argues that American foreign policy followed four traditions: 
American exceptionalism, neo-isolationism, liberalism, and realism. These four traditions 
have independent definitions but are interrelated. American exceptionalism is defined as 
the idea that “Americans constitute an exceptionally good and great people, who 
represent above all a commitment to personal freedom or liberty…” (Forsythe, 2002, p. 
502). Idealistic Americans view their nation as a “city on a hill” (Forsythe & Beatham, 
1995, p. 112). Neo-isolationism is “a unilateral choice not to engage deeply on many 
international issues.” (Forsythe, 2002, p. 503). Liberalism follows the principles of “law 
and individual morality…, international cooperation, human rights, and other basic 
liberal notions” (Forsythe, 2002, p. 505). Realist foreign policy “emphasizes the exercise 
of coercive power by states-unconstrained if need be by conventional notions of law and 
individual morality” (Forsythe, 2002, p. 507). Forsythe (2002) contends that a president 
could use more than one of these philosophies. For example, while Jimmy Carter 
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embraced a liberal foreign policy, he also embraced the idea of American exceptionalism 
while constructing a “government as good as its people” (Forsythe, 1992; Forsythe, 2002, 
p. 517; Forsythe & Beatham, 1995; Kramer, 2005). Carter felt that human rights are a 
“natural extension” of everything American, a position connecting human rights to both 
the liberal and American exceptionalism traditions (Stuckey, 2008, p. 42). 
 Forsythe (2002) explains how the four foreign policy traditions impact human 
rights policy. In the United States, despite being a weaker head of state than a prime 
minister or a dictator, the president is the main driving force behind foreign policy 
decisions (Forsythe, 2002). Congress and other groups, such as the media, are disjointed 
and lack knowledge. They are not effective policy makers and actually interfere with 
presidential policy making (see Forsythe, 2002). Because of the mixed philosophical 
tradition in the United States and the weakness of the president, there is a “great 
ambivalent – some would say confusion and inconsistency…” in applying human rights 
approach to foreign policy (Forsythe, 2002, p. 516). The very structure of the American 
system did not allow consistent support of human rights (Forsythe, 2002; Stohl et al., 
1984). Carter used a foreign policy strategy that allowed him maximum flexibility for 
negotiation and diplomacy. It allowed him to focus on human rights when it was 
diplomatically advantageous (Stuckey, 2008, p. 107). For example, after looking at a 
country’s human rights record to make a decision regarding arms distribution, its human 
rights record is usually not examined again. To further support this idea, Stohl et al. 
(1984) tracked the distribution of foreign aid to nations and found that the distribution of 
foreign aid did not consistently support a human rights foreign policy.  
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 It is unlikely for a United States president to craft a consistent human rights 
foreign policy even when he sets out to do so. However, Shestack (1989) contends that 
the United States will continue to pursue a human rights based foreign policy because (1) 
it makes the nation uniquely relevant; (2) it serves security interests; (3) it creates a just 
world order; and (4) it values liberal democracies. Washington will continue to support 
democracies because doing so endorses human rights and civil rights values that fit with 
the American exceptionalism myth (Forsythe & Rieffer, 2000). After cataloging foreign 
policy decisions, Forsythe (2002) found that the Democratic Party was more likely to 
focus on human rights.  
Jimmy Carter specifically tried to make human rights a focus of foreign policy 
during his presidency (Forsythe, 2002; Forsythe & Beatham, 1995; Kramer, 2005; 
Schmitz & Walker, 2004; Shestack, 1989; Stohl et al., 1984; Stuckey, 2008). Congress 
took the lead during the Ford administration paving the way for Carter to use a human 
rights foreign policy as both a campaign issue and a major issue of his presidency (Bell, 
1984; Forsythe & Beatham, 1995; Schmitz & Walker 2004). Jimmy Carter (1982) 
covered some of these attempts in his memoirs.  
Carter and Human Rights During His Presidency 
Despite his best efforts and rhetoric Carter failed to implement a consistent human 
rights policy during his presidency (Forsythe & Rieffer, 2000; Shestack, 1989). Carter’s 
rhetoric on human rights often came across as preachy (Bell, 1984; Shestack, 1989). 
Carter had to expend a great deal of resources attempting to get congress to support his 
foreign policy decisions (cf. Carter, 1982 for detailed accounts of congressional fights 
over Panama and China). Ultimately, Carter developed a policy that worked with regimes 
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like China and Panama to encourage human rights reforms (Bell, 1984; Kramer, 2005; 
Shestack, 1989).  
 Carter was never able to gain mass public support for his human rights efforts 
(Stohl et al., 1984). While Carter (cf. Carter, 1982, for an extended account of his Human 
Rights efforts) integrated human rights into his foreign policy, ultimately he 
acknowledged it to be unsuccessful. Stohl et al. (1984), in their study of human rights and 
foreign aid, indicated that “…Jimmy Carter did not actually usher in a new era of United 
States foreign policy with respect to the distribution of United States foreign assistance” 
(p. 223). Even supporters of a revaluation of Carter’s foreign policy, such as Schmitz and 
Walker (2004), acknowledged that inconsistencies damaged support from congressional 
leaders who were human rights advocates.  
Carter examined each foreign policy decision as a separate action resulting in 
what many claim were purposeful inconsistencies (Schmitz & Walker, 2004). Carter’s 
failures were well documented. Bell (1984) contended that his focus on human rights and 
moralism was so inconsistent that it could have led to war. For example, Carter stuck to a 
noninterventionist philosophy in Nicaragua. Communists subsequently took control of 
the government. Carter’s commitment to not engaging in military intervention came into 
conflict with his position that democracy was essential to human rights. As a 
consequence, Reagan, while on his way to a huge victory, did not hide his contempt for 
the Carter administration’s foreign policy (Jacoby, 1986).  
 Forsythe (2002) notes that non-governmental agencies usually have little effect on 
United States foreign policy. They lack the resources to compete with other interests. 
Carter (1993) felt that it was the obligation of the United States as a nation to ensure 
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human rights for everyone. He dealt with an oppositional congress that prevented the 
implementation of some of his policies (Stuckey, 2008). Despite the opposition Carter 
was able to use human rights as a justification for the passage of the Panama Canal 
Treaty and the overthrow of the white supremacist government in Zimbabwe (Kramer, 
2005). Carter was able to successfully cement human rights into the executive branch. He 
instated a human rights desk in the Department of State (Stuckey, 2008).  
Human Rights Ideograph 
Carter’s conceptualization of human rights was an expansive liberal definition 
that includes peace, freedom to vote, food, shelter, and medical care (for a detailed 
account see Carter, 1993). In the context of the 1976 political climate, human rights 
served as an ideograph upon which Carter built his national ethos (Stuckey, 2008).  
An ideograph is “an overarching ideology” such as “‘liberty,’ and ‘equality’” 
(Lucaites, 1998, pp. 18-19). The ideograph functions within the American political 
system as an idealistic and abstract philosophical construct that is difficult to argue 
against. Ideographs are powerful, positive terms that politicians seek identification with.  
Carter was the first president to develop a strategy that used human rights as a key 
value and policy goal (Stuckey, 2008). He argued that morals dictate his focus on human 
rights, “Human rights has always meant the protection of human freedom as understood 
through a capitalist view of democracy associates with the myth of American 
exceptionalism” (Stuckey, 2008, p. 82). Carter rhetorically used the term “human rights” 
as an ideograph (Stuckey, 2008, p. 41). Using the human rights ideograph was an 
effective rhetorical strategy. However, it did not serve as a useful tool to implement 
policy or to become reelected. Future presidents built on Carter’s use of human rights as 
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an ideograph using the strategy to promote trade, humanitarian aid, and war. George W. 
Bush used human rights to justify his military actions in 2002 and 2003 (Stuckey & 
Ritter, 2007) 
Phronesis 
 Carter’s human rights advocacy developed out of Carter’s commitment to 
American exceptionalism (Stuckey, 2008). Stuckey (2008) notes that “for Carter, human 
rights was a natural extension of everything that unified Americans—history, ideology, 
and political practice” (p. 42). Carter’s commitment to human rights over personal 
political gain was similar to the ancients’ rhetorical ideal of phronesis (Kramer, 2005). 
 The Greeks had two terms, phronesis and deinesis, to describe how politicians 
worked within the political system (Corbin, 1998). Deinos was the ability to work the 
political system for one’s own gain with very little care given to morals, history and/or 
philosophy (Corbin, 1998). Phronesis, on the other hand, implies the use of morals and 
knowledge to evaluate all policy options available to work for the advantage of the state 
as opposed to the advantage of specific individuals (Corbin, 1998; Self 1979). Isocrates, 
for example, advocated rhetoric based on the idea of a unified Greece (Corbin, 1998). 
Isocrates used the Persian Greek war to argue for the Greek city states to form a greater 
Greek state (Corbin, 1998). He believed this was the next logical step in the development 
of Greek society. Cicero and others defined such a rhetor as a “good man speaking well” 
(Kennedy, 1972). Phronesis allowed the individual to attain an ethics based practical 
wisdom. In Carter’s case, his faith-based views of human rights served as the basis for his 
role as a rhetorical phronikon.  
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 Corbin (1998) describes Michael Calvin McGee’s idea of contemporary 
politicians practicing phronesis. Politicians, for example, must have knowledge of ethical 
history. They must use such knowledge to construct stories that illustrate positive moral 
philosophies. In addition politicians must endorse policies that are based on moral 
philosophies. A phronimos or phronikon, then, is a person imbued with practical wisdom 
who uses that wisdom to make changes for the good of society. If politicians are able to 
initiate policies that benefit society as a whole only then will they benefit as well. 
 I contend that Carter’s post-residential human rights rhetoric modeled a form of 
faith-based phronesis. Stuckey (2008) argues and provides examples that show Carter 
believes that human rights legislation is necessary because it is based on moral principles. 
Stuckey contends that (Stuckey, 2008, p. 71) “Carter tied human rights to his personal 
ethos, grounded in his religious and regional identity; connected it to the overarching 
goals and ethos of his administration and to his political party.” Kramer (2005, p. 16) 
believes that Carter’s “moral rhetoric” can be distinguished from other presidents because 
he used it at as a criteria for decision making that benefitted the United States and its 
people. Unfortunately, Carter was unable to gain congressional support for his policies, 
specifically international treaties. There is little doubt that such failure contributed to his 
reelection loss to Reagan (Bell, 1984; Stuckey 2008).   
Restraints on Presidential Phronesis 
 Despite Carter’s success representing human rights as an American ideograph, 
Carter failed to establish consistent human rights based foreign policy (Forsythe & 
Rieffer, 2000; Shestack, 1989). Even though he advanced human rights legislation and 
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policies, he was unable to implement them. Implemented policies were done so for 
political advantages rather than the absolute support for human rights (Stuckey, 2008).  
 Stuckey (2008) argues, however, that the Carter presidency created the right 
climate in which to develop a faith-based, human rights foreign policy. Nevertheless 
following Vietnam and the Nixon scandals both history and philosophy showed that no 
one person should control all important foreign policy decisions (Schlesinger, 2004). 
Indeed, the Carter administration argued that politicians could be corrupted by power.  
 Carter left office with an extremely hostile congress that restrained him from 
completing very basic human rights foreign policy goals. Congress refused to ratify any 
of the human rights treaties he signed (Stuckey, 2008). Surprisingly Ted Kennedy, who 
ran against Carter in 1980, openly opposed many of Carter’s domestic and foreign policy 
initiatives. Congress prevented Carter from functioning as a phronikon functionally 
because the institution did not value his faith-based humanitarian policies. 
 As President, Carter was tied to governmental rules, laws, and ideologies. 
Phronesis limited Carter’s ability to excessively criticize U.S. foreign policies. A 
phronikon president would, instead, promote American Exceptionalism. Carter could 
fight for human rights but not condemn the nation’s failure to pursue human rights 
policies. He was left to argue that pursuing human rights goals would benefit America. 
Carter (1996) explained his feeling regarding political limitations:  
Any government, even the most benevolent has inherent limitations. The best it 
can do is strive to establish a society that enhances freedom, equality, and justice. 
There are deeper religious values, such as atonement, forgiveness, and love that 
transcend what government can achieve. When governments reach their limits, 
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the teachings of Jesus Christ and of the prophets of other faiths must prevail. (pp. 
110-111) 
Comments such as this imply that Carter placed his pursuit of faith-based ideals ahead of 
governmental protocols. In addition to showing his frustration for the limits of 
government, Carter explicitly stated that the laws of God transcend the limits of 
government. I establish here that Carter’s post presidential rhetoric relied more on faith-
based moral truths rather than truths ideologically rooted in “American Exceptionalism.” 
Research Questions and Methodology 
 This project investigates two research questions. 
RQ 1: What forms of argument differentiate Carter’s presidential and post-
presidential human rights rhetoric? 
RQ 2: How did Carter’s evangelical Christian faith affect his rhetorical posture as 
a human rights phronikon? 
 To answer these questions, this study is divided into two parts. Chapter II reviews 
scholarship that discusses Carter’s rhetoric from the 1976 campaign to the end of his 
presidency. In Chapter III, 25 of Carter’s speeches delivered between 2000 and 2009 are 
critiqued rhetorically. 
Numerous artifacts can be studied from Carter’s post-presidency. A time line of 
Carter post-presidential human rights foreign policy activities is provided in Appendix A. 
The Carter Center Website (www.cartercenter.org) chronicled the Center’s and Carter’s 
efforts to promote human rights globally. Twenty-five transcripts of speeches given by 
Carter were obtained from the website. The speeches covered a variety of human rights 
foreign policy topics. A list of these speeches is provided in Appendix B.  
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 The time period (2000-2009) was chosen for a number of reasons. First, by 2000 
Carter established himself and the Carter Center as human rights foreign policy 
advocates. Second, in 2002 Carter was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Third, Carter's 
foreign policy activity and a Nobel Peace Prize provided him with several invitations to 
speak to international audiences. Fourth, Carter as an individual and de facto head of the 
Carter Center discussed numerous human rights issues in the speeches. Lastly, groups of 
speeches for this time period are not accessible (Historical Materials in the Jimmy Carter 
Library, 2010). The Jimmy Carter Library has not catalogued any post-presidential 
speeches and refers researchers to the Carter Center for access to post-presidential 
materials. Speeches catalogued by the Carter Center are used for the project. 
 I contend that the 10-year period studied represent a unique group of speeches. As 
noted, Brinkley (1998) chronicled the first 16 years after the Carter presidency. There are 
several editorials available from the first 20 years of Carter’s post-presidency. They, 
however, are rhetorically different documents from the speeches in that they address 
broad audiences on a variety of topics. Carter rarely mentions his faith. However, Carter 
frequently discusses his faith in his speeches.  
 Carter appeared to increase his public use of his faith-based rhetoric after he 
published Living Faith in 1996. Carter noted the limits of public office on his faith. 
Carter’s shifted from what Hart (1977) described as an “official civil religionist” as 
president to an “unofficial civil religionist” in his post-presidency. An “official civil 
religionist” is the president or another high level elected official that “endorse the 
religious character of American society” (p. 19). “Unofficial civil religionists” represent 
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“political or religious (or quasi-religious) groups who promote interplay between civil 
and religious principles” (Hart, 1977, p. 21).  
 Ultimately, this study will add new information to the body of literature in 
communication studies. First, to date, no comprehensive study of Carter’s post-
presidential speech making has been completed. Second, I describe Carter’s use of faith 
to support human rights. Finally, I discuss the implications of using faith-based rhetoric.  
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CHAPTER II 
CARTER’S FAITH-BASED ETHOS 
 A review of literature in the communication discipline revealed how Carter used 
faith-based rhetorical appeals to establish his credibility (ethos), beginning with the 1976 
presidential campaign through the 1980 presidential campaign (Erickson, 1980; Gustainis 
& Hahn, 1988; Kawshima, 1977; Martin, 1983; Rarick, Duncan, Lee, & Porter, 1977). 
Carter’s success in the 1976 presidential race in large measure may be attributed to his 
ability to establish credibility as a non-corrupt, moral political figure (Lee, 1995a; Martin, 
1983; Patton, 1977). Ironically, many of Carter’s rhetorical failures during his presidency 
and the 1980 campaign can be linked to his failure to maintain credibility as a “wheeler-
dealer” policy maker (Brummett, 1981; Erickson & Schmidt, 1982; Martin, 1983; 
Rostron, 1997). Regardless, Carter consistently used credibility as a major part of his 
rhetorical strategy to influence voters and pursue foreign policy initiatives.  
 During the 1976 presidential campaign, Carter made rhetorical decisions that 
focused on his personality rather than political issues (Lee, 1995a; Patton, 1977; Rarick, 
Duncan, Lee & Porter, 1977; Self, 2007). Kawashima (1977) studied Carter’s 1976 
campaign speeches, observing that he used inductive arguments to argue against the 
status quo. Carter made consistent use of personal examples to establish a cause and 
effect relationship that linked his personal morality to prudent policy decisions. This 
strategy distinguished Carter from Ford. 
 Carter contrasted himself against the negativity enveloping American presidential 
politics following the Watergate scandal. Martin (1983) asserts that credibility was 
important in the campaign because Carter could contrast his squeaky-clean image against 
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the crime-riddled Nixon administration. The Carter campaign took great measures to 
place Carter in situations that emphasized character and downplayed the importance of 
policy making. They felt that Carter would always have the advantage if the candidate’s 
credibility was the main issue. Carter, for example, spoke first in the presidential debates 
so that he could focus the debate on personality and moral issues (Self, 2007).  
The campaign also chose to rhetorically display Carter’s religious beliefs 
prominently throughout the campaign (Erickson, 1980). While only Erickson (1980) links 
Carter’s religious appeals to building ethos, others noted that the Carter campaign made a 
choice to strongly emphasize religion as a rhetorical tactic during the campaign (Boase, 
1989; Hahn, 1980; Perry, 1997).  
 Carter’s personal experiences were key to crafting his presidential campaign 
image. Carter used his experiences to transcend traditional political myths (Lee, 1995b; 
Patton, 1977). Lee (1995b) argues that Carter was able to transcend the myth of the small 
town hard-working American and the myth of the egalitarian progressive urban American 
by telling his personal story. Carter used his life story of living in a house with an 
outhouse, working as a farmer, joining the navy, working in the scientific field, and 
returning to his small town lifestyle. Lee (1995b) believes that the link between small 
town virtue and big city competence created a mythos that transcended traditional 
conceptions of political competence. Rostron (1997) believes that Carter became a Frank 
Capra-esque common hero, a small town common man with uncommon skill and 
determination, much like Jimmy Stewart’s character in Mr. Smith goes to Washington. 
Carter used rhetoric to show he was an outsider intent on transcending Washington 
politics.  
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 Carter’s transcendence of traditional Washington politics applied to his campaign 
arguments as well. Patton (1977) argues that the campaign was designed to challenge 
current political practices and introduce new values to the political scene. Carter 
contended, in his campaign rhetoric that people were intrinsically good. The argument 
was that intrinsically good people find good within themselves and vote for good people 
to represent them. Labeling all people as good allowed Carter to appeal to a universal 
audience. The rhetoric was transcendent because it allowed people to move past their 
notions of a government in crisis. It allowed the audience to rediscover good government. 
Carter defined himself as the best man for the job by emphasizing his strong morals, 
intelligence, and competence (Martin, 1983; Patton, 1977). Emphasizing personal 
characteristics allowed Carter to shape the political race by focusing on issues of personal 
credibility rather than specific policies.  
A focus on personal credibility for the 1976 campaign proved to be an effective 
strategy, but it was not effective during his presidency or the 1980 campaign. Lee 
(1995b) notes that the transcendent rhetorical combination of small town morality and big 
city progress failed to garner support for his policies. The administration repackaged 
Carter as a competent policy maker by pushing his experience outside of Plains, Georgia. 
Martin (1983) believes that the best man definition was hurt by Carter’s shift to political 
issues rather than morals. The best man definition of a moral, intelligent, and competent 
leader harmed Carter when his policies failed. Carter met all of the characteristics of a 
phronikon except good policy making. Carter could not maintain the definition of 
perfection he crafted for himself (Martin, 1983). As a result “Carter suffered from a lack 
of charisma and star quality” (Smith, 2000, p. 185).  
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 Carter’s limited policy success undercut his ethos. Johnson (1997) notes that, 
despite having a lackluster presidency, Carter managed to execute two noteworthy 
policies. The Carter Doctrine made oil a strategic military interest and that decision 
impacted foreign policy long after Carter left office. Carter’s most noted accomplishment 
was the Camp David Accords. He firmly established Camp David as a useful location for 
foreign policy negotiations (Smith, 2000). Other than these two examples, Carter’s 
administration floundered. It forced him to defend a mediocre presidency (Rostron, 
1997). Rostron (1997) notes, for example, that Carter’s malaise speech shifted blame to 
the citizenry for the administration’s failed policies, which destroyed his mythical hero 
ethos (p. 9). By not taking responsibility for the administration’s failed policies, he had 
failed to represent the ideal of a phronikon, a status he claimed would be achieved during 
his presidency. 
 Hahn (1985) illustrate the rhetorical failings of Carter’s ethos-based rhetoric (they 
analyzed Carter’s 1980 State of the Union Address). In his first response to the Iranian 
hostage crisis, Carter set himself up as a moral figurehead. Carter offered few actual 
policy solutions, but instead combined absolutist rhetoric with vacillating conciliatory 
language. Carter listed moral goals and stated challenges but offered no policy based 
solutions. The only solutions that Carter offered were character based moral stances, like 
humanitarianism. Hahn (1985) believes that Carter’s failure to implement policies that 
supported his moral stance harmed his popularity. In turn, this failure to implement faith-
based policies helped establish his reputation as a failed phronikon. 
 Similarly, during the 1980 campaign, Carter failed to link his faith-based ethos to 
a coherent presidential image. Brinkley (1998) believes that Carter’s image problems 
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developed because his presidential policies do not square with his moral posture. For 
example, at the end of his presidency Carter stopped advocating faith-based policies. 
Carter used the strategy of silence, once during the end of his presidency, and once 
during the early part of the 1980 campaign (Brummett, 1980; Erickson & Schmidt, 1982). 
Brummett (1980) examines Carter’s two-week summer silence in response to the oil 
crisis. Silence made Carter appear indecisive, created an artificial drama, and resulted in a 
passive rhetorical response to the crisis (Brummett, 1980). Silence did not allow Carter to 
clearly promote his faith-based ideals. 
Erickson and Schmidt (1982) examine Carter’s use of silence (also known as the 
Rose Garden strategy) during the Iranian hostage crisis. Carter remained in Washington 
for 182 days during the primary election season. Although Carter avoided direct 
confrontation with political opponents, he nonetheless linked his rhetorical success to the 
resolution of the hostage crisis. Much of the Erickson and Schmidt (1982) work focused 
on positives and negatives of silence as a rhetorical tool. Some of the consequences listed 
include isolation from his campaign, lack of grassroots campaign activity, and an unclear 
campaign platform.  
Despite rhetorical failures leading up to the 1980 campaign, Carter tried to 
maintain his image as a positive moral leader (Porter, 1990). Carter’s use of silence did 
not result in the development of a presidential figure that could be trusted to bring 
positive policy changes (Brummett, 1980; Erickson & Schmidt, 1982). During the 1980 
campaign Carter also attempted to vilify/mortify Americans for their over consumption 
and materialism. His rhetoric failed because audiences did not accept accusatory rhetoric 
intent on producing feelings of pain and guilt (Brummett, 1981). Mortification failed as a 
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strategy. Carter, ironically, became associated with the pain and guilt he wanted to accuse 
others of (Brummett, 1981).  
Carter failed to implement faith-based policies. This led to rhetorical failures 
when Carter attempted to use idealized presidential myths (Martin, 1983). Myths like the 
“best man” myth that rallied the public in 1976 failed in 1980 because Carter was unable 
to project the image of phronikon. In turn, Carter’s attacks on Reagan’s character failed 
to find mass appeal (Martin, 1983). Carter’s character rhetoric failed to persuade the 
public in the 1980 election. Regardless, he continued to depict himself as a moral 
character long after the election (Brinkley, 1998; Martin, 1983). 
Carter’s Use of Religious Rhetoric 
 A second major theme of Jimmy Carter’s ethos was the claim that he was a “born 
again” Christian. Carter made a conscience choice to emphasize his religion during the 
1976 presidential campaign (Boase, 1989; Hahn, 1980; Perry, 1997). Carter emphasized 
religion for a number of reasons. He wished to reach out to an evangelical base that 
constituted 20% of the voting base (Erickson, 1980; Hahn, 1980). Throughout the 
campaign, Carter’s religious rhetoric modeled the rhetoric of the evangelical Christian 
movement (Balmer, 1989; Gould, 2003; Smith, 2000). He was open and candid about his 
faith (Berggren & Rae, 2006). Carter was well aware of the advantages and 
disadvantages of emphasizing religion (Hahn, 1980). Carter, for example, was 
interviewed by Playboy near the end of the campaign. The contrast of the magazine with 
the religious campaign theme shocked and/or offended many voters (Solomon, 1978). 
Carter’s willingness to be interviewed by Playboy revealed that Carter rhetorically used 
his religious faith as a campaign strategy (Hahn, 1980; Smith, 2000).  
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 The political choice to stress religion helped Carter develop support for his 
campaign in 1976. Johnstone (1978) contends that Carter was able to make restoration of 
faith a major issue in the campaign. Carter stated, “I can be a better President because of 
my faith” (Hahn, 1980, p. 61). Other candidates and the press followed Carter’s lead 
(Erickson, 1980). Religious restoration rhetoric was a direct response to the political 
scandals of the 1970s. Carter suggested that problem issues could be resolved by placing 
faith in good people, their decision making, and government. At the Democratic National 
Convention in 1976, Carter told the people that faith in government could be restored 
through faith in him (Johnstone, 1978). The link between faith and policy solutions fit 
with the concept of a presidential phronikon. Carter held the position that he would be a 
competent president insofar as his faith would lead to sound policies.  
 Rarick et al. (1977) observe that Carter used his religious rhetoric to develop 
religious fantasies that linked his leadership to a “restoration of faith” (p. 262). Lee 
(1995a) tied these fantasies to his small town roots to establish that he was a traditional 
American man of faith. One way Carter sustained the fantasy was by attending church 
and teaching Sunday School. The religious persona fit with a small town persona (Lee, 
1995a). The establishment of a religious-based ethos allowed Carter to establish trust 
with the audience. 
 Carter’s religious rhetoric crafted a unique political identity. Erickson (1980) 
labeled this identity “civic piety.” Carter’s religious rhetoric was generic enough that he 
could appeal to a mass audience. Carter effectively communicated his message to people 
holding a variety of faiths. Carter reaffirmed the notions of civic piety and faith-based 
rhetoric “to reestablish faith in America and draw together the electorate” (Erickson, 
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1980, p. 235). He successfully brought together people of faith. Evangelical support at 
the voting booth contributed to Carter’s victory in 1976.  
   Johnstone (1978) believes that Carter’s restoration of faith theme was not 
effective during his presidency because policies did not match religious restoration 
themes. Boase (1989) notes that Carter was very open about his belief in God during his 
inaugural address. However, Carter believed in the separation of church and state. Issues 
like prayer in school and abortion effectively distanced Carter from the religious 
evangelical right (Boase, 1989). The incompatibility of his policies with evangelical 
beliefs contributed to his failure as a phronikon. 
 Scholarly literature examining Carter’s use of rhetoric during the 1980 campaign 
focuses on Carter’s inability to use religious rhetoric effectively (Boase, 1989; Brummett, 
1981; Miller & Wattenberg, 1984; Porter, 1990). Carter’s policy and rhetorical choices 
during his presidency directly contributed to the loss of his evangelical base during the 
1980 campaign (Boase, 1989; Carter, 2000). Even worse, by 1980 evangelicals were so 
turned off by the policy choices they did not engage or contribute to Carter’s reelection 
campaign (Miller & Wattenberg, 1984).  
 Carter attempted to use religious rhetoric during the 1980 campaign. Carter 
argued that America still had an unfulfilled mission that could be fulfilled by hard-
working individuals and divine intervention (Porter, 1990). Carter, of course, depicted 
himself the political agent through which change could be enacted (Porter, 1990). 
Carter’s moral and religious convictions, however, were called into question (Brinkley, 
1998). Carter painted his detractors as demonic and sinful (Brummett, 1981). However, 
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Carter’s use of religious themes failed to garner any significant support in large measure 
due to his political ineptness as a policy maker.  
 In summary, Carter used moral and religious appeals to attempt to establish his 
credibility. His use of religious and moral appeals was a natural extension of his Southern 
Baptist up-bringing (Stuckey, 2008). He used morality to get audiences to think about 
foreign policy issues with more “empathy and responsibility” (Kramer, 2005, p. 26). This 
allowed him to differentiate himself from the Vietnam and Nixon era politicians. 
However, as president, the religious good man speaking well rhetoric failed because a 
coherent policy agenda never materialized. Carter’s religious philosophy lacked a clear 
policy agenda resulting in the image of a failed phronikon. Chapter III will explore 
Carter’s use of his faith-based rhetoric during his post-presidency, a period during which 
he was unencumbered by the restrictions of the mythical and constitutional presidency. 
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CHAPTER III 
POST-PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC 
Establishing Faith-Based Rhetoric 
 After leaving office Carter spent years doing humanitarian work to establish 
himself as an advocate of human rights. Carter participated in hundreds of human rights 
based activities after leaving office (Brinkley, 1998). Those activities are chronicled by 
Brinkley (1998), and in Appendix A. After 2000, Carter relied heavily on speech making 
to advocate his causes. A large number of these speeches are shared on the Carter Center 
website. The speeches represent a large database used here to study Carter’s position as 
an unofficial civil religionist. I will argue that Carter was free to employ faith-based 
rhetoric during his post-presidency. This chapter discusses the failure of other post-
presidential studies to address this issue, introduces the idea of faith-based apostolic 
rhetoric, and critically analyzes Carter’s use of apostolic rhetoric. 
 In one of the few studies of post-presidential rhetoric, Short (1991) analyzes 
Hoover’s campaign against the New Deal after losing for the second time against F.D.R. 
in 1932. Short argues that Hoover used Jeremiadic rhetorical appeals. He was like a 
prophet of the Old Testament warning the people about a disastrous future that would 
befall them if they followed the leadership of Roosevelt. Short contends that this form of 
sermonic rhetoric could be used by unpopular presidents to re-establish their credibility 
after they leave office. I contend, in contrast, that Carter does not use Jeremiadic rhetoric. 
Rather, I assert that Carter argued for human rights ideals based on their inherent values. 
He did so without the Old Testament warnings of impending doom. 
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 Lee’s (1995b) study of Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric argues that Carter 
presents himself as a humble servant of the people. Lee believes that this is an important 
strategy for unpopular presidents who intend to rebuild their public image and credibility. 
The servant leadership model was used in Carter’s early post-presidency. Carter used a 
servant leadership ideal to establish his post-presidential authority.  
 Unlike Hoover, Carter had ample time to rebuild his public image. Carter did not 
deal with a single issue such as the New Deal. Carter focused on a number of issues 
including human rights, democracy, and peace. Carter’s position as a human rights 
advocate and worker allowed him to avoid Jeremiadic rhetoric. He called on people to 
better themselves. During his post-presidency he could be a servant leader by distancing 
himself from specific political policies. Instead, he served others by embracing and 
asking them to embrace human rights values. 
 Hahn (1985) cites, as a significant rhetorical strategy, Carter’s 1976 proclamation 
of, “I can be a better President because of my faith” (p. 61).  During his presidency, 
Carter used faith and a Christ-centered moral framework as a base for advocating human 
rights foreign policy. Carter (2005a), in the introduction to his book Our Endangered 
Values, says, “I must acknowledge that my own religious beliefs have been inextricably 
entwined with the political principles I have adopted” (p. 6). Carter continued to promote 
those values with his post-presidential work.  
 Lee’s (1995b) argument that Carter is a servant leader of the people does not go 
far enough, I suggest, to explain Carter’s attempts to re-establish his credibility as a 
humanitarian leader. I contend that Carter views himself as a servant of God who makes 
known God’s moral philosophies to uninformed others. His servant posture contradicted 
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a Jeremiadic strategy. Carter did not make himself into an Old Testament prophet 
claiming that the world was moving against God’s divine plan. Rather, I contend that 
Carter acts more like a New Testament Apostle than a prophet of doom. Therefore, 
Carter’s servant posture starts with service to God, followed next by service to the 
people. Ultimately Carter criticizes others if they act against God’s human rights 
principles.  
Carter and Christian Discipleship 
 One way to understand how Carter conceptualized credibility is to examine 
Christian doctrine. Since he identifies himself so closely with his Christian faith, it is 
likely that Carter’s notions of credibility, in the main, developed from his study of the 
Bible. Carter (1996) argues that “for a Christian, the life and teachings of Jesus offer a 
sound moral foundation that includes all the most basic elements that should guide us” (p. 
14). He believes that “…our faith can provide enough courage to apply these Biblical 
lessons to our daily lives” (p. 14). Carter (2005a), when explaining his religious belief, 
notes: 
As evangelicals, we were committed to a strong global mission to share our 
Christian faith with all other people... although individual Christians were free to 
take part in public affairs, we abhorred the concept of church congregations 
becoming involved in the partisan political world. We also believed in religious 
freedom, compassion for unbelievers, and respect for all persons as inherently 
equal before God. (p. 18) 
From Carter’s perspective a credible Christian brings the ideals of Christ to others while 
respecting their beliefs. To Carter, an evangelical Christian, Jesus Christ is a prototypical 
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servant leader. The instructions to the apostles provide a model for all Christian servant 
leaders to follow. As an evangelical Christian, Carter believes bringing Christ’s message 
to the world is essential to his life and faith (Carter, 1996). 
Carter’s concept of Christian servant leadership is closely aligned with Christ’s 
commission to the apostles to spread his teachings. Carter, as a Southern Baptist, believes 
he needs to promote human rights world-wide (Stuckey, 2008). He believes that 
promoting human rights is commanded by God (Stuckey, 2008). Jesus Christ provides 
clear instructions to his apostles (servant leaders) about how to promote his teaching to 
the world in the Book of Matthew Chapter 10 verses 5 through 15 (Holy Bible, New 
Living Translation, 2007): 
(5) Jesus sent out the twelve apostles with these instructions: “Don’t go to the 
Gentiles or the Samaritans, (6) but only to the people of Israel—God’s lost sheep. 
(7) Go and announce to them that the Kingdom of Heaven is near. (8) Heal the 
sick, raise the dead, cure those with leprosy, and cast out demons. Give as freely 
as you have received! (9) “Don’t take any money in your money belts—no gold, 
silver, or even copper coins. (10) Don’t carry a traveler’s bag with a change of 
clothes and sandals or even a walking stick. Don’t hesitate to accept hospitality, 
because those who work deserve to be fed. (11) “Whenever you enter a city or 
village, search for a worthy person and stay in his home until you leave town. (12) 
When you enter the home, give it your blessing. (13) If it turns out to be a worthy 
home, let your blessing stand; if it is not, take back the blessing. (14) If any 
household or town refuses to welcome you or listen to your message, shake its 
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dust from your feet as you leave. (15) I tell you the truth, the wicked cities of 
Sodom and Gomorrah will be better off than such a town on the judgment day.” 
 Based on Biblical instructions, apostolic rhetorical appeals can be broken down 
into three categories. Appeals to authority are directly linked to Christ’s instruction to go 
out and tell the people of Israel about the Kingdom of Heaven. In addition to the gospel 
commission of the apostles, in the Book of Acts apostles are instructed to speak to the 
world because Israel rejected the good news of Christ. Acts, Chapter 13, verses 46-48 
explicate that command (Holy Bible, New Living Translation, 2007):  
(46) Then Paul and Barnabas answered them boldly: “We had to speak the word 
of God to you first. Since you reject it and do not consider yourselves worthy of 
eternal life, we now turn to the Gentiles. (47) For this is what the Lord has 
commanded us: “I have made you a light for the Gentiles, that you may bring 
salvation to the ends of the earth.” (48) When the Gentiles heard this, they were 
glad and honored the word of the Lord; and all who were appointed for eternal 
life believed.  
Evangelical Christians are taught to follow the instructions of the apostles, so they too 
can share Christ’s good news with others. 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, and based on the aforementioned 
commission, an appeal to authority is one that directly reflects teachings of the Bible, 
Christ, and/or the Church. In addition, references to Biblical principles such as justice and 
righteousness will also be classified as appeals to authority. Prayers in the speeches will 
be classified as an appeal to authority. In summary, any statement or argument 
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referencing God is classified as an appeal to authority since Carter views God as the 
ultimate authority figure. 
 Christ requests that apostles do good works. Appeals to honor are developed by 
the speaker when they discuss good works. The relationship between faith and good 
works is explained in James Chapter 2, verses 14 to 18, which discusses the emptiness of 
faith without works:   
(14) What good is it, dear brothers and sisters, if you say you have faith 
but don’t show it by your actions? Can that kind of faith save anyone? (15) 
Suppose you see a brother or sister who has no food or clothing, (16) and 
you say, “Good-bye and have a good day; stay warm and eat well”—but 
then you don’t give that person any food or clothing. What good does that 
do? (17) So you see, faith by itself isn’t enough. Unless it produces good 
deeds, it is dead and useless. (18) Now someone may argue, “Some people 
have faith; others have good deeds.” But I say, “How can you show me 
your faith if you don’t have good deeds? I will show you my faith by my 
good deeds. 
For an evangelical Christian doing good works is an outward display of faith in Christ’s 
teachings. Carter enumerated these good works to show that he honored and followed 
Christ’s instructions. 
 Appeals to morality come from Christ’s directive that the apostle has the right to 
declare the place (Carter is invited to several locales to speak on human rights between 
2000 and 2009) they were invited to holy or unholy. In this case Carter used morality 
appeals to establish his credibility as an arbiter of right and wrong. Appeals to morality 
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deal with pronouncements about the ethics of particular thoughts and actions. His faith, 
then, would lead him to believe that pronouncing an act right or wrong would lend him 
credible support in the eyes of man and God.   
 Thus, a theory of apostolic rhetoric consists of appeals to authority, honor, and 
morality based on Christ’s instruction to the apostles. I further contend that these appeals 
serve to establish credibility within Carter’s faith-based humanitarian speeches delivered 
during his post-presidency, specifically the period 2000-2009.   
Appeals to Authority 
 Carter promotes human rights because he saw it as his responsibility to promote 
God’s will (Stuckey, 2008). The appeals to authority are broken down into two 
categories. Direct appeals to authority reference direct instructions from God or the Bible. 
For the purpose of this study, direct appeals cross into traditional Jewish teaching given 
the use of Old Testament and New Testament teachings by the Christian Church.   
 Indirect appeals to authority referenced divine instruction. One philosophy of 
divine instruction is Aquinas’s theory of natural law. During his presidency Carter crafted 
a unifying religious rhetoric identified as “civic piety” (Erickson, 1980). This generic 
religious rhetoric was not effective during his presidency. However, he uses evangelical 
beliefs to bridge his beliefs to those of other faiths. Both types of appeals to authority 
were used by Carter in 15 of the 25 speeches studied. 
 One way Carter uses direct appeals to authority was to cite Biblical scriptures. For 
example, in three of the speeches Carter used the Old Testament ideals of justice and 
righteousness to argue for peace and human rights for Palestinians. Carter (2007d) noted 
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the importance of the ideals by stating the number of times the terms were used in the 
Old Testament:   
I did all I could, and left office believing that Israel would soon realize the dream 
of peace with its other neighbors – a small nation that then exemplified the finest 
ideals that I have taught on Sundays since I was 18 years old – based on the 
Hebrew scriptures where “Justice” is mentioned 28 times and “righteousness” 196 
times. (para. 13) 
He built credibility for arguments regarding Middle East peace by both complementing 
Israel and referencing authority based teaching. Carter uses terms that both Jews and 
Christians see as divine terms, those, for example, that encourage both religious groups to 
treat others as they would treat themselves.  This argument was made in three speeches 
(Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d).  
 In two of the speeches (Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d) references to justice and 
righteousness are followed by instructions to support human rights. Carter (2007b) spoke 
at Brandeis University and applied the ideas of justice and righteousness to both his cause 
and the University’s namesake,  
What I have covered in these few minutes is a brief summary of the contents of 
my recent book. They provide an avenue that can lead to what all of us want: A 
secure Israel living in peace with its neighbors, while exemplifying the principles 
of ancient sacred texts and the philosophy of Justice Louis Brandeis: justice and 
righteousness. He argued that Israel must embrace the values of justice and 
righteousness when making foreign policies to ensure the country’s long-term 
security. Peace would result from supporting those values. (para. 27) 
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Carter, at the time of the speech, had angered many Israelis with his book Palestine, Not 
Apartheid.  The use of an appeal to authority illustrated that for Carter peace in the 
Middle East is a divine, not human, instruction.  The appeal to authority allowed Carter to 
assert that he spoke on behalf of God. 
 Carter argued for reasonable Biblical scriptural interpretation based on basic 
tenants of Christianity. This allowed Carter to transcend disagreements between 
denominations and present what he determined to be a reasonable scriptural justification 
for his arguments. Carter (2007a), while eulogizing Gerald Ford, argued: 
We took to heart the admonition of the Apostle Paul that Christians should not be 
divided over seemingly important, but tangential issues, including sexual 
preferences and the role of women in the church, things like that. We both felt 
that Episcopalians, Baptists and others should live together in harmony. (para. 25) 
Carter argued that, despite differences in their individual faiths, he and Ford were able to 
work toward common ends when observing fundamental Christian values. Carter and 
Ford used common values to transcend denominational differences and to promote, in 
their estimation, divinely inspired messages.  
 Although Carter claimed that several of the views are supported by divine 
authority, they represent points of argument in the Church community. Carter (2009e, 
para. 20) argued that years of study provided him with the knowledge and wisdom to 
make intelligent judgments about Biblical messages. His seemingly arrogant position is 
appropriate insofar as Carter presented himself as a reasonable interpreter of scripture.  
One controversial topic Carter defends is his support for women in the Church. Carter 
consistently supports human rights throughout the selected set of speeches. This includes 
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arguing for women’s rights in many different cultures and contexts. For Carter, women’s 
rights are part of human rights. He believes a faith-based foreign policy must support 
such rights. When he argues for women’s rights he dismisses competing interpretations 
of scripture insofar as human rights are a universal tenet of his faith. Across Christendom 
there are several interpretations of the rights granted to women by the Bible. Carter 
explained why his experience allowed him to interpret the intention of divine authority. 
I have taught Bible lessons for more than 65 years, and I know that Paul forbade 
women to worship with their heads covered, to braid their hair, or to wear rings, 
jewelry, or expensive clothes. It is obvious to most modern day Christians that 
Paul was not mandating permanent or generic theological policies (Carter, 2009e, 
para. 20). 
 In addition to his long term commitment to God, Carter uses both direct quotation 
and interpretation of divine authority to support his arguments. First, he quotes the Bible 
to claim that men and women are equal noting, “The Holy Bible tells us that ‘There is 
neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for 
ye are all one in Christ Jesus’” (Carter, 2009e, para. 6). Later in the speech he interpreted 
Timothy’s scriptural intent in his letter to the Apostle Paul: “In a letter to Timothy, Paul 
also expresses a prohibition against women's teaching men, but we know – and he knew 
– that Timothy himself was instructed by his mother and grandmother” (Carter, 2009e, 
para. 21). Direct quotation and his ability to interpret authority as a follower of Christ are 
used to construct arguments for women’s rights. The use of authority based arguments 
enhances Carter’s ethos as the Bible justifies his position. 
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 Specifically, Carter cites Paul’s letter to the Romans to establish that women 
participated actively in the Church in the past. His interpretation is difficult because 
general fundamentalist protestant teaching used Paul’s letters to subjugate women in the 
Church. Carter (2009e) argues that: 
At the same time, in Paul’s letter to the Romans, he listed and thanked twenty-
eight outstanding leaders of the early churches, at least ten of whom were women. 
‘I commend to you our sister Phoebe, a deacon of the church … greet Prisca and 
Aquila, who work with me in Christ Jesus … greet Mary, who has worked very 
hard among you… greet Andronicus and Junia, my relatives who were in prison 
with me; they are prominent among the apostles, and they were in Christ before I 
was … greet Philologus, Julia, Nereus and his sister, and Olympas, and all the 
saints who are with them.’ It is clear that during the early Christian era women 
served as deacons, priests, bishops, apostles, teachers, and prophets. It wasn’t 
until the fourth century that dominant Christian leaders, all men, twisted and 
distorted Holy Scriptures to perpetuate their ascendant positions within the 
religious hierarchy. (para. 22) 
Carter uses scriptures to build credibility for a position unpopular among many 
evangelicals, much the same way he used the Biblical ideas of justice and righteousness 
to assert credibility with respect to his comments about Israel. In addition to scriptural 
interpretation, Carter uses appeals to authority to show people’s capacity for individual 
choice and freewill. During Carter’s (Carter 2007a) eulogy of Ford he noted that 
“yesterday, on the flight here from Washington, Rosalynn and I were thrilled when one of 
his sons came to tell us that the greatest gift he received from his father was his faith in 
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Jesus Christ” (para 23). This suggests that Ford’s faith enabled him to assist his son in 
making good choices. Good choices, for Carter, are those that follow divine instruction. 
For an evangelical, the cornerstone of any believer’s faith is the acceptance of Christ as 
one’s savior. The implication here is that others can use their faith in God to make good 
choices. 
 Carter expresses the opinion that Christian philosophy promotes individual liberty 
because of its relationship to freewill. Freewill is the concept that all Christians can 
choose to do right or wrong. In his Nobel lecture Carter (2002d) reminds the audience 
that they have the freewill to choose peace, “God gives us the capacity for choice. We 
can choose to alleviate suffering. We can choose to work together for peace. We can 
make these changes - and we must” (para. 39). This appeal bolsters his credibility in two 
ways. First, it builds Carter’s credibility as an agent of positive change. Second, Carter 
believes in the human capacity to make positive choices. For Carter, one positive choice 
is support of human rights. 
 The appeals to authority also taught people how to act properly. God’s “chosen 
people” should always choose to do what is right. Carter specifically appealed to this 
notion when discussing Israel’s position toward Palestine. Once again, Carter used 
authority appeals to defend a controversial position. In one speech, Carter (2007b) 
explained why the chosen people are protected:   
I have reiterated that our nation’s overwhelming support for Israel comes from 
among Christians like me who have been taught since I was three years old to 
honor and protect God’s chosen people from among whom came our own 
Christian savior, Jesus Christ. (para. 17) 
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In another speech, he makes an identical argument (Carter, 2007, para. 25). Despite 
Carter’s displeasure with Israeli government actions, he needed to argue for Israel’s 
protection in order to justify his displeasure with their policies. Therefore, Carter uses 
divine authority to argue that Israel needs to be protected while simultaneously arguing 
against the Israeli government’s seemingly anti-human rights actions. 
 When criticizing Israel, Carter (2007d) is careful to use appeals to authority that 
back his position: 
I might add that there is wide use of the word “apartheid” in Israel among 
prominent leaders… They have used and explained the word in harsher terms than 
I, pointing out that this cruel treatment of Palestinians is contrary to the tenets of 
the Jewish faith and the basic principles of the Nation of Israel. (para. 21) 
Carter (2007b, para. 15) used similar language in another speech earlier that year, 
justifying his harsh stance by relating it to the Judeo-Christian faith-based position 
against oppression. 
 Carter also uses the phrase Holy Land to describe Israel. The term the Holy Land 
is used twice in the Old Testament. The prophet Zechariah (in the book of Zechariah) in 
Chapter 2 verse 12 states “The land of Judah will be the Lord’s special possession in the 
holy land, and he will once again choose Jerusalem to be his own city.” This prediction 
that the Holy Land would be reserved for the Jews by God had a positive influence on the 
creation of the modern independent Jewish state (Zeitlin, 1947).    
 Carter uses the term Holy Land to help build credibility for his peace efforts in 
Israel. In three speeches he expresses his desire for work toward peace in the Holy Land 
(Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). For example, he discusses his lifelong work 
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to support Middle-East peace, “Many of us know and revere this land as the home of the 
Prince of Peace. It may be difficult for the audience to remember what I inherited as a 
new president concerning the Holy Land” (Carter, 2009d, para. 2). He attempted to build 
credibility for his position on the peace process by claiming that, as a Christian, he has 
much respect for Israel. Thus, Israel above all others should support the will of God. 
Carter argues that human rights directly reflects God’s will. Therefore, Israel should 
support Carter’s human rights goals. 
 Other references toward the Holy Land were used when Carter attacked the Israeli 
government regarding Gaza settlements. On three occasions he explains how the Israeli 
government and/or American support for the Israeli government blocked peace efforts 
(Carter, 2003d; Carter, 2006b; Carter, 2007d). In addition, Carter (2009d) uses the 
Obama administration’s admonishment of the Israeli government to build credibility for 
his position, “President Obama has made peace in the Holy Land a high priority for his 
administration, and special envoy George Mitchell has called for an end to Israeli 
settlement activity and easing of restrictions on Palestinian travel” (para. 26). The use of 
the term Holy Land in reference to Israel was essential to establish Carter’s credibility 
with Israelis even as he admonished their government.  
In addition to arguing for human rights in the Middle East, Carter uses direct 
authority to justify his fight for peace around the world. In his Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance address, Carter (2002d, para. 30) equates his personal goals for peace with the 
teachings of Jesus. This modeled the notion of the Apostolic great commission to bring 
the teachings of Christ to everyone. The appeal attempts to build Carter’s public 
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credibility for his Christian persona and seemingly satisfies his own evangelical need to 
promote Christ’s teaching. 
 Finally, Carter uses prayer to directly communicate with divine authority. Carter 
offers prayer as either an appeal or a means to create peace (Carter, 2003a; Carter, 2003c; 
Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). Twice he states, “I join all of you in praying for this 
achievement” (Carter, 2006a, para. 45; Carter, 2006b, para. 66) when discussing Middle 
East peace and human rights.  
 On two other occasions, Carter offers a prayer using “direct” communication with 
God in order to advance his support of human rights. In a speech to the Georgia State 
Legislature in 2003, Carter (2003a, para. 12) concluded his remarks with the following 
prayer: 
I stand here then as a former senator, as a former governor of a great state, and as 
the former president of a great nation, praying that all of us will commit our hearts 
and our lives to improving the lot of people around the world, and to promoting 
peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, environmental quality, and the 
alleviation of suffering. 
In another 2003 speech reflecting on the Camp David Accords, Carter (2003c, para. 40) 
prayed for peace in the Middle East. This lent credibility to his speech insofar as he asked 
God to support his goals. Christians are taught that prayer should be used to ask God for 
guidance or for things that support the will of God. Public prayer as a rhetorical action 
drew attention to human rights themes by showing the audience that the idea was worthy 
of God’s attention. Prayer implied that human rights are Christian goals not just Carter’s 
idealism. 
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 Indirect appeals to authority invoke a universal divine authority. Often when 
establishing credibility for his causes, Carter would not directly reference Christian 
authority. However, he did reference a higher being, religious philosophy, and/or 
common religious practice to lend credibility to his faith-based position. 
 In three of the speeches Carter appeals to different religious groups, arguing that 
all share a common understanding or goal. For example, during his Nobel Lecture Carter 
(2002d) makes an appeal to alleviate human suffering:   
Despite theological differences, all great religions share common commitments 
that define our ideal secular relationships. I am convinced that Christians, 
Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and others can embrace each other in a 
common effort to alleviate human suffering and to espouse peace. (para. 30) 
Carter also reinforces his ethos by speaking to diverse groups of people holding various 
religious beliefs. In another instance, Carter (2009e) made a similar cross religious appeal 
for the rights of Women internationally:   
Recently I presented my concerns to a group of fellow leaders known as The 
Elders, who represent practicing Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, and Hindus. We 
are no longer active in politics and are free to express our honest opinions. We 
decided to draw particular attention to the role of religious and traditional leaders 
in obstructing the campaign for equality and human rights, and promulgated a 
statement that declares: “the justification of discrimination against women and 
girls on grounds of religion or tradition, as if it were prescribed by a Higher 
Authority, is unacceptable.” (para. 29) 
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In this instance, he establishes the case for women’s rights in the Christian church. If all 
religions support the rights of women, then the Christian church should do so as well. 
This indirect appeal to authority gave a potentially unpopular argument more credibility 
by offering a wider base of support than just looking through a narrow evangelical 
Christian lens. 
 Carter (2009e, para. 27) uses cross-religious appeals to call for the end of 
persecution of women. He rebuked the practices of abuse justified by false teachings. 
Carter expanded his argument using generalized authority to avoid the arguments of 
religious scholars who rely on narrow Biblical passages. I contend that Carter enhanced 
his credibility by looking for consensus with indirect authorities that agree with his direct 
authority (God). 
 Carter (2009c) used a similar appeal to request peace in Jerusalem, “Palestine 
must combine the best of the East and the West. The Palestinian state, like the land, must 
be blessed for all people. Jerusalem must be shared with everyone who loves it – 
Christians, Jews, and Muslims” (para. 12). Carter attempted to appeal to the best in all 
religions to establish credibility for his argument that Israel violated the rights of other 
groups by establishing settlements in the Gaza strip. He established the relative goodness 
of Jerusalem’s neighbors to rationalize their right to occupy Gaza.  
 Another cross-religious appeal dealt with the humanization of others. In his Nobel 
Lecture, Carter (2002d) called for people to avoid the dehumanization of others, “In order 
for us human beings to commit ourselves personally to the inhumanity of war, we find it 
necessary first to dehumanize our opponents, which is in itself a violation of the beliefs of 
all religions” (para. 34). In this case, he used an appeal to all religions combined with a 
43 
statement of his own faith to build credibility for his position. Goodness, for Carter, 
stemmed from his Christian conception of peace and human rights. 
 Both direct and indirect appeals to authority are employed to emphasize Carter’s 
faith. As an evangelical Christian he uses these appeals to reinforce his arguments. These 
appeals illustrated what he considered to be correct philosophical beliefs and actions. 
Carter presented these ideas as an apostle of Christ. 
Appeals to Honor 
 A second form of apostolic appeal addressed honor. Rhetor’s use honor appeals to 
promote their own good works and to establish credibility as an agent of God. In the 
political context, Carter appeared to use good works to establish that he has the best 
interest of others at heart. For this study, honor appeals are organized into three 
categories pre-presidential, presidential, and post-presidential. 
 Pre-presidential appeals were used in 6 of the 25 speeches Carter delivered 
between 2000 and 2009. The pre-presidential appeals established a lifelong commitment 
to service. Service to others established that Carter practices faith-based good works.  
 One significant topic discussed by Carter was nuclear war prevention. In a speech 
on the use of nuclear weapons, Carter discussed his work as a nuclear engineer (Carter, 
2007e). Carter used his credibility as an informed scientist to intellectually discuss the 
topic. Carter discussed his experience with atomic energy to illustrate that he understood 
the seriousness of a nuclear warfare. 
 Carter discussed his actions as Governor of Georgia in three speeches. Twice 
Carter discussed electoral and democratic reform (Carter, 2003a; Carter, 2005b; Carter, 
2009b). In a speech to the Georgia Legislature, Carter discussed positive changes he 
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initiated in the state regarding civil rights and voter access (Carter, 2003a). Carter (2009b, 
para. 5) also referenced his inaugural speech in an address about democracy. Doing so 
established his life-long commitment to equality. Carter provided clear historical 
examples of his support for human rights goals. Carter played by the same rules he asked 
others to abide by. Therefore, Carter used his track record to establish his credibility on 
human rights issues 
 Carter (2005b) also used his actions as governor to establish a relationship with 
the Organization of American States, “I have long been interested in this organization. 
Thirty years ago, as governor of Georgia, I invited the OAS General Assembly to meet in 
Atlanta - the first meeting in the U.S. outside of Washington” (para. 2). The discussion of 
democracy and electoral reform equalized him to the leaders he is addressing. Carter 
established his long term pursuit of democracy to show audiences that he has been a 
faith-based phronikon throughout his political life. Democracy was a cornerstone of 
Carter’s human rights foreign policy. 
 Much like the pre-presidential appeals, presidential appeals to honor established 
credibility by noting past actions that supported the value or policy promoted. 
Presidential honor appeals are used in 20 of the 25 speeches. Carter often used his 
presidential actions to establish a pattern of good works that led to effective post-
presidential actions. These good works are based on his understanding of Christ’s 
teachings (Carter, 1996). For organizational purposes, his appeals are broken down by 
following topic areas, democracy, apartheid, China, Russia, Israel, Middle-East peace, 
human rights, and cooperation with Gerald Ford.  
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 When using presidential honor appeals, Carter promoted his efforts to establish 
democracy and electoral reform. However, unlike the pre-presidential appeals, Carter 
never showed that he was willing to promote internal reform. Instead, Carter explained 
how he helped other countries to become democracies during his presidency.  
 Carter discussed democracy in the Americas in five speeches (Carter, 2002b; 
Carter, 2003e; Carter, 2005b; Carter, 2009b). Carter (2003e) contended that his efforts to 
promote democracy during his presidency led to successful democracies later, “As 
president of the United States, I worked to promote democracy and human rights, and I 
have been gratified to see the acceptance of democracy throughout Latin America” (para. 
9). When delivering a keynote speech to the Organization of American States Carter 
(2005b) noted, “As president, I attended and addressed every General Assembly (of the 
OAS) in Washington” (para. 2). Other comments were directed at specific countries 
instead of at groups countries like the OAS. Carter (2009b) specifically addressed the 
work of his presidency for democracy in Ecuador: 
It is a privilege for me at this moment in our history to be here in Ecuador. Thirty 
years ago this nation began a new wave of democracy in the region while I was 
President of the United States, and my wife Rosalynn attended the inauguration of 
your new president. Now, Ecuador is beginning a new cycle with a new 
constitution, and my own president has proposed a new era in relations between 
the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean. (para. 1) 
All three passages illustrated Carter’s efforts to show that he had a long term commitment 
to support democracy in the Americas. 
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 Attempts to build credibility for his position to democratize China followed the 
same pattern. In three of the speeches, Carter addressed his relationship with China 
during his presidency (Carter, 2002a; Carter, 2003b; Carter, 2009a). Comments dealt 
with visits, diplomatic relations, and reform.  
 Carter used great detail to describe his past interaction with China. Carter claimed 
that his relationship with Deng Xiaoping produced many benefits (Carter, 2001b; Carter, 
2009a). Specifically, in a 2001 speech about village elections in China (Carter, 2001b, 
para. 4), Carter gave a very detailed account of their long term relationship, promotion of 
rural village democracy, promotion of free enterprise, and exchange visits. Carter 
emphasized the equality of his relationship with Deng Xiaoping in his arguments. 
Together, Carter and Deng brought democratic reforms to China. Carter used the 
relationship with Deng to illustrate that he employed human rights principles when he 
negotiated for human rights. 
 He also emphasized establishing diplomatic relations with China (Carter, 2002a; 
Carter, 2003b). Carter (2002a) spelled out in great detail with whom and how relations 
were established: 
I’m sure that all of you know about the US Constitution, which grants this 
prerogative to  the President unilaterally. The President can declare diplomatic 
relations with any country on earth, and the Congress has nothing to say about it. 
It’s a constitutional right, and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of our 
country’s history, our founding fathers were wise enough to recognize existing 
governments, or de-facto governments, without all the nuances of ‘Do you please 
me, or do you not please me?’  But in the last century we departed from that 
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practice. But I simply decided that we should recognize the Chinese government. 
(para. 30)  
Carter left no doubt that he was the primary reason the United States diplomatically 
recognized China. He also proclaimed that the relationship significantly benefitted China 
and that it was “…one of the wisest decision I made during my time in the White House” 
(Carter, 2003b, para. 6). In addition to working with Deng, Carter promoted his 
willingness to acknowledge Chinese accomplishments. 
 Carter (2009a) also implied that democratic reform and recognition went hand in 
hand: 
On the 16th day of December, 1978, Deng Xiaoping announced in Beijing that he 
and I had been successful in our negotiations. So reform and opening up the 
society of China and new diplomatic relations with the United States were indeed 
the starting point for wonderful changes in your country. (para. 5) 
In the same speech he concluded that “this new friendship has been wonderful for your 
people and for the people of the United States. I believe it's also been beneficial to the 
entire nation, and the entire world and people all over the Earth” (Carter, 2009a, para. 6). 
Carter reinforced the notion that he was and is an integral part of the reform process in 
China. This showed a track record of engagement with a nation and a continuing 
commitment to human rights reforms. Once again, Carter showed how his good works 
support human rights goals.  
 On the topic of Russia, Carter discussed two main topics, nuclear arms reduction 
and Jewish emigration. When he dealt with the nuclear arms issue, Carter (2007e, para. 4) 
used the stories of avoiding nuclear mishaps and cooperation with Russia to establish his 
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commitment to peace and disarmament. Carter (2007e) also explained in the speech that 
peace and human rights were pursued despite the threat of a nuclear holocaust. He 
discussed his commitment to support human rights in the former Soviet Union. During 
his Nobel address, Carter (2002d) reminded the audience of his support for human rights 
and peace activist Andrei Sakharov. (para. 5) 
Carter also used support for Sakharov and Jewish emigration to enhance his 
credibility with Israel (Carter 2007b): 
After becoming president, I began to communicate publicly with noted human 
rights heroes like Andrei Sakarov and to confront Soviet leaders at every possible 
opportunity I had with them on behalf of Natan Sharansky and others. This 
increased tension between me and President Brezhnev, president of the Soviet 
Union then, but within two years, annual Jewish emigration to America from 
Russia increased to more than 50,000. (para. 5) 
Despite the threat of nuclear weapons, Carter stated that his commitment to human rights 
and Jewish emigration was so strong that he risked tension with the Brezhnev 
government (Carter 2007b; Carter, 2009d). Carter seemingly placed support of human 
rights above the threat of nuclear war. 
 As previously noted, controversy generated by Carter’s book Palestine: Peace 
Not Apartheid placed Carter in a position where he had to rebuild his credibility with 
Israelis and Jews in the United States. Like support for Jewish emigration, Carter used the 
acts of his presidency to attempt to reestablish his public support for Israel. Honor 
appeals on this topic area included discussions of secondary boycotts, establishing the 
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holocaust museum, problems facing Middle-East peace, the Camp David Accords, and a 
speech before the Knesset. 
 The secondary boycott law was mentioned in three speeches (Carter 2007b; 
Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). Carter (2007b) reminded the audience when discussing 
Israeli abuse of Palestine that he faced “…an oil embargo by Arab OPEC nations, with a 
secondary boycott of any American corporation doing business with Israel” (para. 4). On 
the three occasions he mentioned support for the secondary boycott law. This (Carter 
2007b, para. 6) is summarized well in the speech at Brandeis University, “We also 
supported a very controversial law sponsored by Congressman Ben Rosenthal that 
prohibited secondary boycotts against Israel, with the severe penalties against any U.S. 
corporation that violated the new law” (para. 6). Once again, Carter showed his support 
for human rights, even if the consequences were an oil embargo (which happened). 
 Another point used to increase his credibility mentioned in the same three 
speeches was support for the construction of the Holocaust Museum (Carter 2007b; 
Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). The passage from Carter’s (Carter, 2009d) acceptance 
speech for the Mahatma Gandhi Award is representative of the position taken by the three 
speeches: “In 1978, on Israel's 30th birthday, I announced a commission to establish a 
memorial to victims of Hitler's atrocities, with Elie Wiesel as its chairman. The Holocaust 
Museum in Washington is the result of their good work” (para. 7).  
 One of the biggest problems Carter faced during his presidency was the war 
between Israel and Egypt. Carter (2003c, para. 7) explained that even before his 
presidency started he wanted to restructure the peace process. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that he discussed the Camp David Accords in five of the speeches studied. 
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 Carter discussed the Camp David Accords, to emphasize his role in the Middle 
East peace process (Carter, 2003c; Carter, 2006a; Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 
2009d). In a 25
th
 Anniversary speech honoring the Camp David Accords, Carter (2003c) 
explained how his approach to the negotiations contributed to the meeting’s success:   
I personally used what was called a single document--I have been involved in a 
lot of negotiations since then, and I've always used a single document--getting my 
superb  assistants, who were all on the program this morning, to ultimately prepare 
a proposal that was presented precisely word by word to the Israelis, primarily to 
Prime Minister Begin, and to Sadat and to the Egyptians on the other side. We 
didn't have one document for one and one for the other. (para. 14) 
He also noted later that “As one of my highest priorities, I negotiated the Camp David 
Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978, in which, in exchange for peace, Israel agreed 
to grant full autonomy to the Palestinians and to withdraw Israeli military and political 
forces from lands of the Palestinians and Egypt” (Carter, 2007d, para. 12). Carter clearly 
viewed the Camp David Accords as one of his great achievements during his presidency. 
The Accords comprised another good work he used to bolster his commitment to human 
rights. 
 Carter’s book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid generated much negative publicity. 
Carter uses the Camp David Accords to show that he has a track record of supporting 
Israel in a fair and just manner. Carter (2006a) stated “I am proud to say that not one 
element of the 1979 peace agreement has ever been breached” (para. 7). He also claimed 
that “This agreement was ratified by an 85 percent majority in the Israeli Knesset” 
(Carter, 2009d, para. 8). Carter used success and fairness to establish credibility. 
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Nevertheless he uttered many controversial statements. One such statement was delivered 
in a 2006 speech about the recognition of the Palestinian elections, “As I said in a 1979 
speech to the Israeli Knesset, ‘The people support a settlement. Political leaders are the 
obstacles to peace’” (Carter, 2006a, para. 42). Regardless, Carter still used his work for 
peace in Israel during his presidency to attempt to establish credibility for his post-
presidential position regarding the Middle-East. He also showed that he placed human 
rights above potential consequences such as ill-will from the Israeli government. 
 In addition to democracy and peace, Carter also used presidential acts to lend 
credibility to his human rights efforts. Specifically, Carter discussed his efforts to shift to 
a human rights based foreign policy (Carter, 2005b; Carter, 2008a). Carter (2005b) noted, 
“I decided to stop embracing dictators and to make the protection of human rights a 
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, not only in this hemisphere, but with all nations” 
(para. 3). Carter (2007c, para. 1-2) claimed he shifted to a human rights foreign policy 
because he saw the devastating effects of segregation in the south and that the U.S. would 
help prevent its reoccurrence worldwide. In addition, Carter (2009b) felt the previous 
administrations were: 
…wrong and so we decided to protect the human rights heroes who came forward 
to condemn the abuses. I announced in my inaugural address that human rights 
would be the foundation of our foreign policy and that every ambassador that 
worked for me in every country in the world would be my personal human rights 
representative. And that every United States embassy residence in the world 
would be a haven for people persecuted by their own government. (para. 6) 
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The idea of making human rights his first priority supported the notion that human rights 
is a divine instruction 
 Finally, Carter (2007a) illustrated cooperation to support human rights during 
Gerald Ford’s eulogy. He (2007a) expressed his pleasure regarding Ford’s ability to heal 
the country:   
I still don’t know any better way to express it than the words I used almost exactly 
30 years ago. For myself and for our nation, I want to thank my predecessor for 
all he did to heal our land. (para. 32) 
Carter expressed his desire to work with Ford on several key points during his 
presidency. He specifically focused on the Camp David Accords, noting, “In fact, on a 
helicopter in flight from Camp David back to Washington, President Anwar Sadat, Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin and I made one telephone call, to Gerald Ford, to tell him that 
we had reached peace between Israel and Egypt” (Carter 2007a, para. 16). In summary, 
presidential honor appeals reminded listeners of Carter’s success at promoting human 
rights. 
 Post-presidential appeals to honor were used to reinforce his commitment to 
human rights and were used in 19 of the 25 speeches. Carter used both his personal good 
works and those of the Carter Center to support his arguments. Carter often places post-
presidential accomplishments next to appeals to authority to illustrate that he promotes 
just causes. Carter (2007d, para. 16) also claims that he is an appropriate agent to support 
international human rights, noting, “Few people have had a greater opportunity than I 
have to understand the complex interrelationships from personal observations” (para. 16). 
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Carter’s post-presidential appeals are divided into two groups, personal actions and those 
of the Carter Center. 
 Carter made personal visits to China, Japan, Nepal, North Korea, Cuba, and Israel 
as well as other countries during the years following his presidency. Carter discussed 
those visits in order to show his commitment to human rights values. He often 
emphasized election monitoring efforts to demonstrate his commitment to help build 
democratic governments. 
 It is no surprise, based on the other information presented from the speeches, that 
China would be a focus of Carter’s post-presidential work. During the time period the 
speeches were presented, Carter focused on helping China monitor elections and helping 
rural economic reform. Carter (2003b) outlined some of his work in one of the speeches 
regarding Chinese village elections:  
On my several visits here during the past 22 years, I have enjoyed hours of 
discussion with Deng Xiaoping and his successors and have had an opportunity to 
visit many regions of your country to witness its economic progress and its 
dramatic moves toward a more open society. More freedom of worship, the 
movement of your people, the rights of free enterprise, and China's increasing 
involvement in the World Trade Organization and other international 
organizations have been very gratifying to me. (para. 7) 
This parallels pre and post-presidential appeals that established Carter’s long term 
commitment to support Chinese democratic reforms.  
 Carter also discussed his work in other Asian nations, including Japan, Nepal, and 
North Korea (Carter 2002a; Carter, 2003c; Carter, 2007e; Carter, 2007f). He noted that 
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he immediately visited Japan and China as soon as he left office (Carter, 2003c). The 
Carter Center, for example, monitored Nepal’s elections. Carter (2007f) emphasized how 
important it was to have hands on experience in the Nepalese culture:  
Having just left the White House, I was privileged to meet the royal family and 
political leaders, as well as the wonderful Sherpa guides and to have leisurely 
visits among the monasteries in the high mountains. We then enjoyed the beauties 
of the Terai, on the border with India. (para. 1) 
Carter established his long term commitment to help Nepal and other Asian countries. 
 By contrast, Carter used his humanitarian work in North Korea to reinforce his 
ethos during award acceptance speeches. Carter in two speeches, the Oksenberg Award 
and the Albert Schweitzer Humanitarian Award, discussed his negotiations with Kim Il-
Sung in 1994 (Carter 2002a; Carter, 2007e). A sample of that conversation is contained in 
Carter’s (Carter, 2007e) Schweitzer Award acceptance speech: 
Later, in 1994, I went to North Korea and convinced President Kim Il Sung to 
abandon his plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel rods into plutonium, which 
could be made into explosives. This was a successful mission, and an official 
agreement was consummated by President Bill Clinton to replace the 
decommissioned power plant with fuel oil and the technology for two modern 
atomic power plants under International inspection. (para. 7). 
Carter (2002a) also explained more of the aftermath of the negotiations in the Oksenberg 
Award acceptance speech: 
So I went to North Korea, my wife and I, and we crossed the DMZ from Seoul, 
and went to Pyongyang, and got complete agreement with Kim Il Sung. Then we 
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came back. It was the first time in forty-three years that anyone had made that 
round trip. (para. 45) 
Carter used his support for human rights causes to justify his worthiness to receive the 
awards. He used similar examples to justify his right to promote human rights goals and 
policy. Carter used the appeals to establish that his experience uniquely qualified him to 
serve as an agent of God, an assertion he believes served him well.  
 When discussing Middle-East peace, Carter used three issues to establish ethos, 
including experience through travel, dedication to the subject, and a sense that he could 
facilitate peace efforts. Carter (2007d) claimed that “after leaving the White House and 
forming the Carter Center, my wife and I visited Israel, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, 
and Gaza at every opportunity, to encourage peaceful relations between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors” (para. 14). In an earlier speech on the same topic at Brandies University, 
Carter (2007b, para. 10) made a similar claim. Carter attempted to enhance his standing 
with the Israelis by showing that his interactions with people in the Middle-East gave him 
a better understanding of the peace process. Carter (Carter, 2007d) summarized, “…I 
have spent a great deal of my adult life trying to bring peace to Israel and its neighbors, 
based on justice and righteousness for the Palestinians. These are the underlying purposes 
of my new book.” (para. 18). Carter used his post-presidential experience like that of 
other appeals to honor, to claim that good works licensed his right to speak on the issue.  
 Carter also used the works of the Carter Center to enhance his credibility. Carter 
used general comments about the Carter Center to establish a history of good works. 
Carter clearly explained what foreign policy issues he dedicated his post-presidential life 
to (Carter, 2003a), stating, “Let me say that my life and the life of Rosalynn for the last 
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20 years has been in The Carter Center” (para. 9). In addition, Carter (2008a) referred to 
the Carter Center as a place where good works will live on. 
 The Carter Center’s work is used by Carter to show the triumph of good over evil. 
Carter noted, for example, that over the twenty year history of the Center he shared the 
benefits of human rights policies with the Chinese people (Carter, 2002a). In addition, 
Carter (2009b, para. 10) notes that the center helps countries build democratic 
institutions. Carter often explicates the benefits countries gain from working with the 
Carter Center. 
 Carter (2002d) also used the work of the Carter Center to link himself to human 
rights work: 
I am grateful to my wife Rosalynn, to my colleagues at The Carter Center, and to 
many others who continue to seek an end to violence and suffering throughout the 
world. The scope and character of our Center's activities are perhaps unique, but 
in many other ways they are typical of the work being done by many hundreds of 
nongovernmental organizations that strive for human rights and peace. (para. 2) 
Carter contends that the center is inclusive, specifically in the area of human rights, 
offering their services to organizations such as the United Nations (Carter 2007c). The 
Center also offers conferences that address human rights. The Center enhances Carter’s 
credibility as it represents his commitment to God and the support of human rights. 
Carter, like he does with most human rights issues, uses the Center’s work to enhance his 
credibility. 
 A major focus of Carter’s work is the promotion of democracy. Carter (2003e) 
explains how a democratic system is necessary to guarantee equal rights. “I have learned 
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that it is healthy to have competing ideas on policies and visions for the country, but there 
must be a clear consensus on the rules of the game used to choose among these 
alternatives” (para. 9). Carter (2006c) also argued that there is an inherent relationship 
between human rights and democracy. “For 20 years now, The Carter Center has 
considered the promotion of freedom and democracy to be an integral part of our thrust 
or commitment to human rights” (para. 2). Carter uses several specific examples of 
democracy building in his speeches. Carter equates a democratic government with 
securing human rights (Stuckey, 2008). 
 Carter (2006c) often refers to the Center’s work with developing democracies in 
the Americas and Africa:  
We’ve had two elections in Liberia. Both of them fair, for the people expressed 
their choices freely. The first one was a disaster because of the choice the people 
made, and the most recent we hope brings prospect for a permanent peace and 
freedom and human rights to the people of Liberia. One of the most glorious 
elections in which I’ve been a part of was in Haiti in 1990. We had high hopes 
that for the first time the people of Haiti had expressed their view and that their 
chosen leader would be successful. It turned out to be a disastrous process and 
Haiti is still suffering. We're hoping that there might be some redemption coming 
for those people. I’ve been to Haiti eight times; several of them to help with 
election processes. (para. 6) 
In the same speech Carter discusses the Center’s assistance with election monitoring in 
Nigeria and Venezuela. For Carter, democracy is a faith-based universal positive value. 
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Governments can corrupt themselves but only when they move away from democracy, 
which in turn moves away from the teachings of God. 
 Carter also discussed election monitoring in Nepal. During the 2000s Nepal 
transitioned from a monarchy to a democracy, and dealt with a minor insurgent group. 
Carter (2007c) showed his willingness to participate in an effort to support human rights 
in Nepal despite its potential dangers, stating, “I have just returned from Nepal where, as 
with World War II, a commitment to human rights has been derived from intense military 
conflict” (para. 21). Carter combined the potential danger of the visit with the success of 
election monitoring to promote his and the Center’s promotion of democracy. 
 Carter also cites the Palestinian elections as an example of the Carter Center’s 
democracy promotion efforts. He argues that the election, because it was monitored, 
legitimizes the Hamas government (Carter, 2006a). Carter also claims that the elections 
in Palestine promote fairness, honesty, and bring out the best of people (Carter, 2006b; 
Carter, 2006c). In an excerpt from Carter’s speech (Carter 2007b) at Brandeis University 
in 2007, he explains the history of the Carter Center’s election monitoring efforts in 
Palestine:  
More recently, I have led The Carter Center in monitoring the Palestinian 
elections of 1996, 2005, and 2006, which required from me and my associates at 
The Carter Center a thorough and intimate involvement with the candidates who 
ran, public officials, and Palestinian citizens throughout East Jerusalem, the West 
Bank, and Gaza, and also working closely with Prime Ministers Shimon Peres in 
1996, Ariel Sharon in 2005, and Ehud Olmert in 2006, who gave their full 
political support to these adventures. (para. 11) 
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In addition to establishing the election process as credible, Carter used the Center’s work 
with the Palestinian elections to enhance his authority to address Middle-East peace 
issues. Carter again used the tactic of showing a long-term commitment to human rights 
goals and activities. 
 Carter also relied upon his faith-based credibility to promote health care and 
disease prevention. Carter (2008a) stated, “About three-fourths of The Carter Center's 
work, our money and personnel are devoted to five so-called neglected diseases” (p. 4). 
The Center promoted the use of medicine and other preventative measures to stop the 
spread of disease (Carter, 2008a). Specifically, the Carter Center focused on eliminating 
Guinea worm in Africa. Carter graphically described the disease to explain the need for 
eradication. He noted references to the Guinea worm in the Bible. He showed that the 
Carter Center can identify a specific problem, make a plan to promote a solution, and 
implement it.  
 In addition to improving health conditions, Carter showed a bridge between health 
care awareness and individual rights. For example, Carter (2007c) explained the link 
between the two in a speech he delivered on human rights in Dublin, Ireland in 2007: 
In many parts of Africa, mandatory circumcisions are still pervasive religious 
rites, and it is taboo for many women to urinate or defecate where they might be 
seen, even though no private places exist. In Ethiopia, we capitalized on this 
abuse to promote our control over trachoma, by teaching construction of simple 
latrines. Our target was 10,000/year, but it became a “women’s liberation” project 
and 306,000 were built in the first three years. I have become known as the 
“father of latrines.” (para. 19) 
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Despite the fact that only two of the speeches dealt extensively with health issues, Carter 
used these humanitarian efforts to show how he helps enhance the lives of at risk 
individuals. 
 Carter also noted his ability to enlist partners for his work with the Carter Center 
in order to establish the divine nature of his faith-based works. This is similar to the 
credibility Carter attempted to gain from his consultations with Ford. Carter made a 
number of comments about partnerships (Carter 2007a; Carter, 2007e). For example, at 
Gerald Ford’s funeral in 2007, Carter (2007a) credited Ford for helping him establish the 
Carter Center “In the early days of the Carter Center, Jerry joined me as co-chairman in 
all of our important conferences and projects. And I never declined an opportunity to help 
him with his own post- presidential plans” (para. 20). Carter used this and other 
partnerships to show that others also supported the promotion of human rights. 
 In summary, Carter often referenced a cartoon the New Yorker that said, “When I 
grow up I want to be an ex-president” (Carter 2007a; Carter, 2009a; Carter, 2009e). 
Overall, Carter used his faith-based works as a main strategy to reestablish his ethos 
during his post-presidency. As a former president, he was free to pursue human rights 
without the restraints of holding office. By showing his good works he transcended 
politics because, in his estimation, God directed his actions.  
Appeals to Morality 
 Appeals to morality allowed Carter to make faith-based pronouncements about an 
audience’s ethical actions. Carter followed Christ’s request to pass moral judgment on 
audiences. He tells audiences whether or not they live up to his religious values. Appeals 
to morality appear in 10 of the 25 speeches examined.  
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 A central appeal of morality involved asking the audience to hope for a better 
future. Both faith and hope are core values for an evangelical Christian. A Christian has 
faith in Christ’s teachings that a brighter future is ahead (whether that future is on earth or 
in heaven). Carter calls upon audiences to adopt his value system so that they, too, can 
anticipate a better future. 
In a speech to the Organization of American States in 2005, Carter (2005b) stated 
that, “we need each other. Let us work together to make our hemisphere the beacon of 
hope, human dignity, and cooperation for the 21st century” (para. 45). Another appeal to 
hope involves Middle East Peace where Carter (2009c) noted, “With our new leaders in 
Washington, my country will move into the forefront of this birth of a new Palestine. We 
were all reminded of this renewed hope and commitment by President Obama's recent 
speech in Cairo” (para. 13). Appeals to morality referencing hope were used to both 
praise and condemn. Carter praised those that could see that human rights policies would 
result in a positive future. He condemned those that blocked human rights policy and 
prevented their constituents from having hope. 
 Carter also uses moral pronouncements when requesting groups to employ 
universal human rights. He even references his high school teacher (Carter, 2002d; 
Carter, 2009a; Carter, 2009b). In a speech in Ecuador addressing democracy Carter 
(2009b) explained that his high school teacher supports positive universal philosophies, 
noting, “… I quoted my high school teacher, Miss Julia Coleman. She said: ‘We must 
accommodate changing times, but cling to unchanging values.’ There is no way to build 
institutions, reinforce democracy or promote general well-being without respect for 
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fundamental moral values” (para. 23). Carter used his teacher as a condemnation of sorts. 
Every person, even a child, should know that democracy is a universal principle. 
 Carter addressed other issues such cooperation and peace. He told nations, 
governments, and individuals that they should be working toward these goals. In a speech 
at the Carter Center in 2006, Carter (2006c) announced:  
This conference is a small group and like I said, The Carter Center has no 
authority; but I think that the promulgation of what you bring to us, the ability for 
the human rights defenders to consult with one another, and all of us (to) share in 
a common commitment to correct mistakes and to publicize problems is the 
purpose of this conference. (para. 17) 
Carter called upon other human rights advocates to condemn those who harm others. 
 While moral appeals are outnumbered by the other appeals they nevertheless 
serve an important purpose. Carter fulfilled Christ’s call to the apostles to judge those 
who offer invitations. He publicly rewarded and rebuked those that are doing right and 
wrong. This increased his credibility because he can, as an independent citizen, 
communicate a human rights message consistent with his religious values.  
Summary 
 In summary, I established the idea of apostolic rhetoric as a lens by which critics 
may examine Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric. 25 speeches were examined from 2000 
to 2009. Three apostolic appeals were examined: authority, honor, and morality. After 
critically examining the speeches it is clear that Carter’s human rights rhetorical 
strategies are grounded in the values taught by Jesus Christ. However, Carter promotes 
the moral philosophies of Christ because he believes God commands him to do so.  
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 Carter’s rhetorical style is clearly similar to a style Hart (1977, p. 21) labels an 
“unofficial civil religionist.” Carter consistently used his faith to advocate both human 
rights and democratic reforms. Implications for the use of this rhetorical strategy are 
Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
A critical analysis of Carter’s speeches from 2000 to 2009 enables me to conclude 
that Carter’s Christian faith significantly influenced his rhetorical style when promoting 
human rights. He uses his faith to promote human rights as a universal value. 
Observations are developed regarding Carter’s use of faith-based rhetoric by answering 
two research questions. I conclude by offering both advantages and disadvantages of 
faith-based rhetorical strategy, and explain how they draw presence to arguments. 
Research Questions 
RQ 1: What forms of argument differentiate Carter’s presidential and post-
presidential human rights rhetoric? 
 At the end of Chapter I, I argued that Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric 
emphasized Apostolic principles. I contend here that apostolic rhetoric provides a critical 
lens through which to view Carter’s use of religious beliefs in his post-presidential 
rhetoric. In addition, I identify a distinction between phronesis and apostolic rhetoric. 
 First, phronesis requires that a rhetor develop political wisdom in order to 
promote the interest of the state (Corbin, 1998). It is in the rhetor’s best interest as a 
citizen to promote right actions as they promote the best interests of the state. In this 
manner a phronikon becomes a good man speaking well (Kennedy, 1972). However, self-
interests frequently impede the efforts of rhetors to act on behalf of the state. Partisan 
politics trump the greater good. In the case of Jimmy Carter’s post-presidency he turned 
to his religious beliefs as a model of the good man speaking well. Instructed by God, 
Carter believed his rhetoric spoke to the greater good of humanity. From Carter’s 
65 
perspective, he represents a modern-day phronikon who set aside partisan politics and 
addressed the betterment of the state and its citizenry. In contrast, an apostolic rhetorician 
determines what he or she believes is right or wrong based on religious principles. 
Arguments are developed that support the rightness of an action based on faith-based 
values, thereby creating positive outcomes.  
 Second, phronesis requires that a rhetor derive wisdom from several sources 
including personal experiences, study, and morals in order to develop good policies. 
Apostolic rhetoric draws wisdom from a religious authority figure. The rhetor’s 
experiences and education are drawn from the God’s teachings. For Carter, wisdom came 
from the teachings of Christ. Carter demonstrated his commitment to Christ’s teachings 
through his actions/faith-based works. Carter also praised those that support the teachings 
of Christ and cautions those that do not. Practical wisdom is replaced with faith-based 
moral principles as opposed to policy. Carter supported human rights because he believed 
it to be the right thing to do, not because it is practical or politically advantageous. 
Practicality took a back seat to faith-based instruction of right action. 
 A third distinction is that Carter believes power is granted by a religious authority, 
not the state. A phronimos/phronikon must put into practice what the rhetor thinks is right 
(Corbin, 1998). In a democracy, this is accomplished by working within the political 
system to transform ideas into policies. However, in Carter’s post-presidency, he was not 
restricted to enacting his policies within a political system. Carter used the power of his 
faith (Christian ideals) to promote human rights. Carter, a religious phronikon taught 
leaders why they should follow God’s principles when governing their nations.  
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 Fourth, as president it was difficult for Carter to employ a consistent human rights 
foreign policy (Forsythe & Rieffer, 2000; Shestack, 1989). Carter had to work within the 
system to implement practical and incremental change. Some of the changes resulted in 
long term support of human rights by future presidents (Stuckey, 2008). However, Carter 
had difficulty selling these benefits when he ran in 1980. During his post-presidency, 
Carter remained consistent because he was not bound by the need to implement political 
policy. He was also not tied to the will of the electorate. Carter pursued human rights 
without considering political consequences or his electability.  
I contend that Carter believes God ordained him to support human rights. He 
likely believes as well that promoting human rights leads to positive outcomes. As an 
evangelical Christian, the best possible outcome of spreading Christian teachings is for an 
audience member to accept Christ as their Lord and Savior, to become born again. 
Spreading Christianity enabled Carter the opportunity to bring millions closer to a state of 
being born again. The second research question dealt with how these argumentative 
changes would affect Carter’s rhetorical posture. 
RQ 2: How did Carter’s evangelical Christian faith affect his rhetorical posture as 
a human rights phronikon? 
 Examining Carter’s speeches through the lens of apostolic rhetoric reveals that 
Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric focuses on moral principles rather than the advocacy of 
specific policies. In Chapter I, I established that Carter failed as a political phronikon 
during his presidency insofar as he had difficulty enacting policies that were consistent 
with his faith-based perceptions of human rights.  
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 In addition to addressing human rights, Carter believes that human rights 
transcend politics. In the Havana Cuba speech in 2002, Carter (2002c) portrays human 
rights and democracy as inalienable rights: 
I am not using a U.S. definition of “democracy.” The term is embedded in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Cuba signed in 1948, and it was 
defined very precisely by all the other countries of the Americas in the Inter-
American Democratic Charter last September. It is based on some simple 
premises: all citizens are born with the right to choose their own leaders, to define 
their own destiny, to speak freely, to organize political parties, trade unions and 
non-governmental groups, and to have fair and open trials. (para. 2) 
Carter clearly believed that human rights and democracy should be pursued regardless of 
a rhetor’s personal consequences or political ambitions.  
 Finally, I contend that Carter’s faith-based rhetoric allows him to make 
enthymatic arguments. Enthymemes are not just fact based arguments but can reflect the 
values of a rhetor as well (Conley, 1984). Carter’s faith-based enthymatic arguments 
signal the values he wants his audience to endorse. Carter argues that good policies result 
from the support of faith-based values. Carter wants audiences to visualize the benefits of 
supporting human rights, and to utilize the services of the Carter Center.  
Advantages and Disadvantages of Apostolic Rhetoric 
 Carter developed a new political persona following his presidency. The shift from 
an official civil religionist to an unofficial civil religionist reflected a major change in his 
rhetorical persona. These changes resulted in several advantages for Carter. The 
advantages can only be utilized by a former president that fulfills the role of an unofficial 
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civil religionist. One advantage that Carter cites is the ability to discuss controversial 
issues (Carter, 2006b). As president, Carter had to temper his speech with respect to the 
best interests of the country and for his electability. However, as a surrogate of Christ, 
Carter felt that he could assert controversial positions because he believed himself to hold 
correct beliefs. He even joked that his secret service protection enabled him to do so 
(Carter, 2006b, para. 2). As such, apostolic speakers, as opposed to politicians, have the 
opportunity to transcend the political process in order to address value based problems. 
 The second major advantage of an apostolic position is that rhetors lack an 
obligation to advance policy solutions. As noted earlier, Carter advocated value positions, 
such as human rights, without advancing a specific policy solution. He made suggestions 
but allowed audiences to decide upon solutions. However, by not offering specific 
policies, Carter positioned himself to argue for or against a policy action based on the 
whether or not it supported human rights. Carter also used the Carter Center to assist 
countries who requested help in implementing human rights policies.  
 These two advantages are useful primarily to a Christian rhetorician who does not 
plan to run for reelection (Carter, 1982). Carter acknowledged that his political career 
was over when he lost the presidency. He started using more overt religious messages in 
his writing and speaking during his post-presidency. Carter’s belief in the separation of 
church and state prevented him, as president, from melding the two. During his post-
presidency he no longer felt obligated to separate religious beliefs from human rights 
advocacy (Carter, 1996). As an official civil religionist Carter had to maintain the 
separation but as an unofficial civil religionist he currently promotes the mix of religion 
and civic activities. 
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 Another disadvantage of transitioning from politician to apostolic rhetor is one’s 
religious faith. In Carter’s case, he advocated human rights and tied democratic elections 
to human rights (Stuckey, 2008). Employing apostolic rhetoric forced Carter to 
consistently maintain his faith-based advocacy. I contend that a shift away from faith-
based advocacy would lessen his effectiveness as a human rights advocate. Abandoning 
faith-based advocacy would present an inconsistent message. 
 Finally, apostolic rhetoricians could be viewed as religious zealots if they stray 
too far from mainstream cultural values. Fortunately for Carter, human rights are 
favorable values in American culture, and his religious advocacy is close to the beliefs of 
mainstream society (Stuckey, 2008). Carter uses his position as an unofficial civil 
religionist to link human rights to civil values. Carter’s positions are not viewed as 
extreme but rather the visions of an idealist.  
Rhetorical Presence and Faith-based Human Rights Rhetoric 
 Originally, I believed that Carter’s ability to draw people to him would be a 
central discussion point. However, as I critiqued his speeches it became clear that the 
relationship between faith and human rights was central to this study. As such, I focused 
on an analysis of Carter’s faith and human rights. Nevertheless, it is evident that Carter 
attempted to make human rights issues present for his audience. The theory of rhetorical 
presence, conceptualized by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) in The New Rhetoric, 
is defined as the thing which the eye dwells on when multiple things are available 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). It is the rhetor’s job to draw the audience to 
specific points when there is an infinite amount of information available for the audience 
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to focus upon. Obviously, astute speakers draw the audience’s attention to issues that 
cement their arguments in an audience’s mind. 
 During his presidency Carter filled the role of what Hart (1977) called an official 
civil religionist. During the 1976 campaign, “Carter’s religious-political discourse 
reaffirmed our civic piety and faith in America, communicated trustworthiness, served as 
a source of identification with evangelicals and religionists, and generated media 
attention” (Erickson, 1980, p. 235). Carter used his private religious beliefs to draw 
attention to his campaign by tapping into ideas that an American audience was already 
primed to hear. 
 During his post-presidency Carter was no longer an official civil religionist but 
filled the role of what Hart (1977) calls an unofficial civil religionist. Representatives of 
groups like the John Birch Society serve as “unofficial civil religionists” when they claim 
that Christian religious principles should be used for governmental decisions (Hart, 1977, 
p. 21). Many of the groups Hart references would be considered right wing religious 
groups. Carter is unique because, unlike right wing groups, he uses his private 
evangelical beliefs to publicly support universal human rights, a traditionally liberal or 
left wing value. 
 A universal audience is primed to listen to faith-based rhetoric because of the 
ritualistic nature of official civic piety (Hart, 1977). Carter’s use of faith-based rhetoric 
allowed him to draw presence to his human rights arguments by linking the two together. 
Carter has consistently maintained that democracy is a necessary political condition for 
the promotion of human rights (Stuckey, 2008). Carter drew “rhetorical presence” to 
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human rights when he portrayed them as an inherent part of both Christian faith and 
democracy.  
 Reality is created when the rhetor successfully advocates an idea to an audience 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Private thoughts are used to draw presence when 
they match the values of a universal audience (Karon, 1976; Oakley, 1997). Carter uses 
his personal ideas about faith to promote human rights. In turn, if the audience accepts 
Carter’s arguments as truth, Carter creates a reality where Christianity and human rights 
are inseparable. 
 Gross (2005) argues that global rhetorical presence is used to examine a text as a 
whole instead of individual arguments. Atkinson, Kaufer and Ishizake (2008) argue that 
selection and presentation elements throughout the entire rhetorical situation constitute 
global presence. In this study, Carter is observed as using the apostolic model to argue for 
human rights. It is a model that most Christian audiences are familiar with. A good 
apostle uses the story of Christ to convert others to Christianity. When global presence is 
applied to Carter’s approach, it is clear that Carter uses his faith-based rhetoric to convert 
audiences to supporters of human rights.  
Conclusion 
 Jimmy Carter is a unique American political figure. His dedication to promoting 
human rights allowed him to remain a relevant figure in international politics following 
his loss of the 1980 presidential election. Dawidoff (2011) sums up Carter’s unique 
political experience:  
That this intelligent, principled, dogged man who remains so steely and enigmatic 
at his center got himself elected president is one amazing American story. That he 
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reinvented a way for a former president to live on in defeat is another. He 
accomplished both by relentlessly looking forward — as he still does today. In the 
end, his personal paradoxes and unresolved contradictions are simply left behind 
by the arrow of his ambition — the ongoing desire to do something more, to go 
anywhere to stay in the game, to make a lasting difference. (p. 13) 
His human rights advocacy allows him to bridge religious values and the secular world. 
Carter used his religious beliefs to stay in the public eye while promoting a faith-based 
human rights policy. The resolve to support human rights comes from his devout 
religious faith and desire to promote good actions. 
 Critiquing faith-based arguments as rhetorical strategies adds to the body of 
knowledge in communication studies. First, Carter’s faith-based rhetoric reflects Hart’s 
(1977) conception of an official civil religionist as president and an unofficial civil 
religionist as a former president. Second, Carter uses faith-based rhetoric to draw 
presence to his human rights arguments. Carter’s post-presidential rhetoric relies on the 
use of personal faith-based appeals to promote human rights. His rhetorical style is 
similar to that of a Christian apostle who promotes Christian teachings. Carter used this 
style to promote human rights and democracy as universally good values. The speeches 
also show how an evangelical Christian uses faith to promote values such as human 
rights.  
 Carter’s faith-based post-presidential rhetoric allowed him to become the 
phronimos/phronikon that he wanted to be as president. Self (1979) notes: 
Obviously, the virtue of phronesis should enable its possessor to recognize and 
articulate the vices and virtues of others. One's own experience in deliberating 
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well about matters of value and consistent selection of the mean should facilitate 
the ability to explain why the conduct of another either does or does not follow 
the "golden mean" and deserves either praise or blame. We might also expect that 
the man of practical wisdom, whose virtue is publically recognizable, would often 
be called upon to speak on ceremonial occasions. These occasions provide a 
forum for the display of practical wisdom and the confirmation of it by the 
audience. (p. 143) 
Carter did exactly what Self (1979) argues a phronimos/phronikon would, he used his 
faith-based advocacy to advocate the virtue of human rights and took every opportunity 
to speak about it. 
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APPENDIX A 
JIMMY CARTER’S POST-PRESIDENTIAL, 
 FAITH-BASED FOREIGN POLICY ACTION 
Introduction 
The following is a chronological outline of Carter’s international post-presidential 
diplomacy. The timeline was constructed using the LexisNexis Academic database to 
search for articles referencing Jimmy Carter in The New York Times. The New York 
Times was used because it has a foreign bureau. Despite a perceived bias, mainstream 
United States newspapers have no significant bias when covering presidential elections 
(D’Alessio and Allen, 2000). In addition, research from Brinkley (1998) and Carter’s 
books are consulted.  
1981 
 Carter spent the early days after his presidency vacationing and shoring up loose 
ends. The Carter family’s first major decision was to formally join Marantha Baptist 
Church in Plains, GA (“Church formed,” 1981). The church was created when the Plains 
Baptist Church Pastor was forced to resign after allowing African-Americans to attend 
services (“Church formed,” 1981). During Carter’s presidency, his family attended 
Sunday school at Plains Baptist Church and services at Marantha Baptist.  
 Other family activities were reported following Carter’s term in office. Carter 
planted trees at his home in Plains, GA and planned a vacation for the family to the 
Virgin Islands in early February (Krebs & Thomas, 1981d; Krebs & Thomas, 1981e). 
Carter’s presidency was romanticized during this period by New York Times editorial 
writers who praised the former president (Rosenberg, 1981).  
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 Carter presided over other post-presidential duties. He prepared memoirs and 
planned to build his presidential library. Carter also hired a literary agent (“Carter hires 
Josephson,” 1981) and sold his memoirs to Bantam Books in early March (McDowell, 
1981a). Carter visited Princeton University to get writing advice and held a question and 
answer session with students (“Carter is troubled,” 1981; Krebs & Thomas, 1981b; 
Safire, W, 1981). He hired a historian to assist him instead of hiring a ghost writer 
(McDowell, 1981b). Carter also gained approval from Georgia universities to start 
building a library (“Atlanta colleges back site,” 1981). They asked him to select a 
preliminary site.  
 Carter refrained from criticizing his successor’s policies. Initially, Carter praised 
President Reagan’s public response to terrorists after the conclusion of the Iranian 
hostage crisis (“Carter Praises Reagan,” 1981). Carter’s comments toward the Reagan 
administration were usually labeled as “concerns” (“Carter is troubled,” 1981, p. B10). 
Carter would not formally criticize Reagan until July (Raines, 1981b). Carter and 
President Ford endorsed a plan for Sunday presidential voting, one of several times the 
two would team up on issues as former presidents (Clymer, 1981). 
 Many of Carter’s appearances were as an honored speaker or award recipient. 
One such appearance was at the Georgia Democratic Party’s Jefferson-Jackson day in 
March (“Carter is an uneasy rider,” 1981). Carter spoke and afterwards other speakers 
were given the opportunity to praise Carter and his presidency (“Carter is an uneasy 
rider,” 1981). Carter was also nominated for the Harry S. Truman public service award in 
March (Krebs & Thomas, 1981f). Carter hung Truman’s picture in the Oval Office 
during his presidency. He was given the Truman Award in May. Carter used this 
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speaking opportunity to blast fringe groups for using scare tactics (“Scare tactics,” 1981). 
Guest speaking engagements provided Carter a platform from which he could make 
political statements. 
 The next issue Carter addressed during 1981 was human rights. Following a story 
explaining why Carter allowed the Shah of Iran into the United States, Carter gave a 
speech to the New York Board of Rabbis (“Why Carter admitted the Shah,” 1981). He 
challenged the United States to continue pursuit of a human rights based foreign policy 
(Carter, 1981b). In late May, Carter continued to push human rights in a speech to 
Southern Baptist leaders (“Views of religious right,” 1981). He argued that racial equality 
and arms control are compatible with Christian beliefs.  
In early July, Carter openly criticized Reagan (Carter, 1981a). He criticized 
Reagan’s failure to address human rights in foreign policy decisions (Carter, 1981a; 
Raines, 1981b; Wycliff, Wright, & Herron, 1981). Specifically, Carter felt that Reagan 
had not pursued SALT discussions, government spending reform, or the environment 
(Carter, 1981a; Raines, 1981b; Wycliff et al., 1981).  
 In late June, Carter announced that he would take a nine-day trip to China, 
followed by a five-day visit to Japan (Krebs & Thomas, 1981c). Citizen Carter would be 
briefed by the state department (Krebs & Thomas, 1981c). Carter would be treated like an 
American dignitary and friend of Communist leader Deng Xiaoping (“Carter to visit 
China,” 1981). Upon arriving in China and throughout his visit Carter was greeted by and 
met with several government officials including Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang, Party 
Leader Hu Yaobang, and Deng (“Carter warmly greeted,” 1981; Sterba, 1981a; Sterba, 
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1981d; Sterba, 1981c). In addition to visiting Communist leaders, Carter toured the Great 
Wall of China and went fishing in the Xian province (Sterba, 1981d; Sterba, 1981c).  
 Carter used the visit to China as a platform to make public comments about the 
relationship between China and the United States. Initially, Carter announced that arm 
sales with Taiwan did not violate unilateral treaties (Sterba, 1981e). The next day Carter 
stated that he learned that the Chinese were scared by normalization talks (Sterba, 
1981c). Carter argued that relations with China were producing “more thunder than 
beneficial rain” (Sterba, 1981e, p. 4.7). At the end of the trip, Carter acknowledged that 
Taiwan was the main issue hindering a mutually beneficial United States-China 
relationship (Sterba, 1981b).  
 Carter discussed several issues with Chinese officials (Sterba, 1981b). One major 
issue was Chinese human rights policy. Specifically, Carter pushed for Christian 
missionary access to China and for a self-reliant Christian Church in the country. Carter 
also noted to the press that if he were president he would continue trading military 
weapons to China (Sterba, 1981b, p. A2). He offered a public assessment of China, 
noting that they were suffering economically and that they had undeveloped resources.  
When Carter visited Japan, his message changed. In a speech to 800 businessmen 
in Osaka, Carter proclaimed Middle Eastern tensions could lead to an oil shock (Stokes, 
1981). In a ninety minute Japanese television interview, Carter criticized the Ayatollah 
Khomeini (Stokes, 1981). He also criticized Reagan’s restart of the B-1 bomber program.  
 Despite Carter’s desire to “stay out of Washington,” he commented on a variety 
of issues and spoke with world leaders (Reston, 1981, p. A31). Israeli Prime Minister 
Begin made a point to visit Carter in Plains, GA after meeting with Reagan in September 
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(Montgomery, 1981). Carter was thrust back into the limelight in October when Anwar 
Sadat was assassinated in Egypt (Raines, 1981a; Carter, 1982). Carter, Ford, and Nixon 
all attended the funeral. Ford and Carter (1981) held a press conference where they 
ranked Sadat among the top of all world leaders. They credited Sadat for the completion 
of the Camp David Accords and then called for Middle East peace.  
 Carter used Sadat’s death to make further comments on Middle Eastern affairs. 
Carter noted that if Kaddafi used Sadat’s death as an opportunity to interfere in Sudan 
then the United States should intervene (Wicker, 1981). He also encouraged Israel to 
return the Sinai to Egypt as soon as possible (Wicker, 1981). Nossiter (1981b) noted that 
the PLO publicly thanked Carter for his calls for peace. Finally, Carter called for a 
stronger United States role in Middle East peace (“Carter to lobby Senate,” 1981). 
Carter’s call to lobby for the approval of AWACS technology to be shared with Saudi 
Arabia to help secure the Middle East put him in direct opposition with Ronald Reagan 
(“Carter to lobby Senate,” 1981; Gailey, 1981b; Mohr, 1981). 
 Carter had a private meeting with Reagan on October 13. After the meeting, 
Carter blasted Reagan, calling him an “aberration on the political scene” (Gailey, 1981b, 
p. A27). Carter argued that Reagan’s economic policy caused mass suffering, called the 
B-1 bomber a gross waste, and criticized Reagan’s lack of commitment to the Middle 
Eastern distribution of AWACS technology. Reagan responded by calling key members 
of Congress to lobby against the AWACS proposal (Mohr, 1981). Carter struck back at 
Reagan during a fund raiser on October 14. He said that under Reagan’s policies he had 
“misgivings about the abortion of hopes and dreams of those struggling for a better life” 
(Rosellini, 1981, p. A6).  
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 During late 1981, Carter was in a minor legal battle with The Washington Post.  
Carter threatened to sue The Washington Post for libel after the paper published a story 
claiming that he had bugged Nancy Reagan’s temporary residence during his last days in 
the White House (Gailey, 1981d). The Washington Post responded to Carter in an 
editorial. They argued that he was a public figure and that readers could discern the truth 
for themselves (Gailey, 1981a). However, The Post eventually decided to retract the 
original story (Gailey, 1981e; Gailey, 1981b). Carter complained that The Post held onto 
the story for two weeks after they knew it was false (Carter, 1981d). Despite his criticism, 
Carter decided to drop his lawsuit (Carter, 1981d; Gailey, 1981c).  
 In December, Carter gave a speech attacking Reagan’s foreign policy to the 
Council on Foreign Relations (Carter, 1981c; Nossiter, 1981a). Carter was critical of the 
one sided foreign policy against the Soviets. He criticized Israel’s annexation of the 
Golan Heights. He argued that the sale of fighter jets to Taiwan created a two China 
policy. Finally, he felt that loans to Latin American countries with poor human rights 
records set a bad example. Carter according to Reagan damaged bipartisan relationships 
by implementing these poor policies. 
1982 
 Carter seemed to scale back his speech making in 1982, possibly because Bantam 
books had a legal embargo on many of his stories until his book was released in October 
(Curtis, 1982a). Carter seemed to want to take shots at Reagan in addition to leading a 
private life as a citizen. Carter criticized Reagan’s lack of involvement in the Middle 
East. He claimed Reagan was jeopardizing the Camp David Accords (“Carter is said to 
seek,” 1982; Krebs & Thomas, 1982). Carter said he would influence policy the best he 
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could as a “private citizen (“Carter is said to seek,” 1982, p. 1.8).” However, Carter also 
praised the Reagan administration’s opposition to Argentinean invasion of the Falkland 
Islands (Krebs & Thomas, 1982).  
In May, Carter said he would never run for public office (Bird & Thomas, 1982; 
“Carter asks Bipartisan,” 1982); he was happy with his private life (Bird & Thomas, 
1982). Carter was running his church’s finance committee. However, he made it clear 
that people had made a mistake by not choosing him in the 1980 election (Bird & 
Thomas, 1982; “Carter asks Bipartisan,” 1982). Carter asked Democrats to think 
positively and called for a bipartisan approach to policy making (“Carter asks 
Bipartisan,” 1982). He believed that was Democratic Party America wanted.  
 Carter planned a trip to Scandinavian countries to promote his memoirs. He 
planned to speak in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland (Bird & Thomas, 1982; 
“Carter asks Bipartisan,” 1982). In Stockholm, Carter disclosed that Brezhnev had 
rejected a nuclear freeze and a European non-aggression pact during negotiations in 1979 
(Vinocur, 1982). He said that the Soviets and the United States had an equal number of 
nuclear weapons (Vinocur, 1982). However, he stated that the Soviets had more 
intermediate range nuclear weapons.  
 When his publisher’s embargo ended, Carter spoke more openly (Curtis, 1982a). 
In October, Reagan blamed an economic recession on Carter (Clymer, 1982). Carter 
responded by noting that he never criticized other administrations for his problems. Yet, 
Carter spoke on other issues. In an interview in Time, Carter criticized Israeli Prime 
Minister Begin for building settlements in the Golan Heights (McFadden, 1982). Richard 
Nixon identified Carter as a contact for Reagan as the president prepared for a visit from 
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Begin in November to discuss the settlement issue (Curtis, 1982b). Toward the end of 
November, Carter and Ford released a joint statement in favor of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They noted the dangers of bi-lateral agreements could 
destroy the world-wide economy (Carter & Ford, 1982).  
1983 
 In January, Ford and Carter teamed up again. In the Reader’s Digest, the former 
presidents accused Israel of not living up to their end of the Camp David Accords 
(“Carter and Ford Criticize Israelis,” 1983). They noted that the Israelis had no wish to 
grant autonomy to the Palestinians. They claimed that King Hussein of Jordan would 
back a peace agreement if Israel stopped putting settlements on the West Bank and in the 
Gaza Strip (“Carter and Ford Criticize Israelis,” 1983). The Reagan administration 
approved of the joint statement (“Ford-Carter Criticism,” 1983). Spokesperson John 
Hughes (“Carter and Ford Criticize Israelis,” 1983) claimed that “real peace can only be 
achieved through negotiated exchange for occupied Arab territory” (p. A3).  
 Despite praise from Reagan, Carter continued to criticize the president and Israel. 
Carter  publicly criticized Reagan’s proposed non-military budget freeze for the 1984 
fiscal year, calling it “unrealistic and unsubstantive” (“Freeze in ’84 Budget,” 1983, p. 
A12). In a conference on public policy at the Ford Library, Carter criticized Begin for 
continuing to settle the West Bank (Peterson, 1983). Carter believed Begin should 
remove troops from Lebanon immediately (Peterson, 1983).  
Despite heavy criticism of Israel, Carter announced plans to make a trip to the 
Middle East (Shribman, 1983). Carter’s trip would include visits to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Carter also tried to schedule a meeting with Palestinian 
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Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat (“Carter in Middle East Trip 
Hopes,” 1983). However, right before leaving Carter ruled out a face to face meeting 
with Arafat. He said the PLO should acknowledge Israel’s right to exist before meeting 
with him (“Carter on a Middle East Trip, Rules,” 1983). Carter chose to pay a courtesy 
visit to Reagan’s special envoy to the Middle East, Phillip Habib, before meeting with 
any foreign government officials. 
 The trip to the Middle East was to coincide with a Carter Center trip (Carter was a 
representative of Emory University). The center studied Middle Eastern policy with the 
intent to develop a new peace proposal (“Carter in Middle East, Hopes,” 1983). Carter’s 
first stop on the trip was Egypt. While there, Carter met with PLO officials (Farrell, 
1983). A week earlier Carter said he would not meet with Arafat. He disclosed that talks 
with the PLO focused on Palestinian autonomy and self-determination (Farrell, 1983). 
Carter did not negotiate with the Palestinians. He contended that, as a private citizen, his 
talks were not in conflict with the Reagan administration (Farrell, 1983).  
When Carter traveled from Egypt to Israel, he was not met with open arms. Upon 
arriving on March 8, Carter spoke with Prime Minister Begin for one hour and refused to 
comment to the press about the meeting (Shipler, 1983b). Carter visited East Jerusalem 
and the West Bank escorted by Mayor Teddy Kollkek. Palestinian protests kept him out 
of some areas he was scheduled to tour (Shipler, 1983c). When he met with Palestinian 
representative Elias M. Freija, Israelis publicly protested (Shipler, 1983c). Three soldiers 
were hurt and one Palestinian school was tear-gassed during the protests (“3 Soldiers 
Hurt,” 1983). However, protests did not stop Carter from making an address at Tel Aviv 
University on March 10
th
.  
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 During the speech at Tel Aviv University Carter outlined why he was interested in 
the Middle East peace process (“Carter Reaffirms Support,” 1983). Carter said that his 
deep religious beliefs led to his commitment for the existence of Israel as an independent 
state. He proclaimed that, “God has ordered and ordained the existence of the state of 
Israel as a permanent homeland of the Jews” (“Carter Reaffirms Support,” 1983, p. A3).  
He reaffirmed his desire to see Palestinian self-determination. Carter believed that the 
Palestinians should negotiate without United States or Egyptian help.  
During a press conference at the end of the visit, Carter once again praised the 
Arab world and criticized Israel (Shipler, 1983a). Carter acknowledged that there was a 
“great move toward moderation in the Arab world” (Shipler, 1983a, p. 1.21). Carter 
blasted Begin, arguing that he had a narrow view of the Camp David Accords. Carter 
believed that the lack of Palestinian autonomy was the fault of both Israel and the Arab 
world. However, he also noted that Israel could not offer autonomy to the West Bank 
overnight. Carter believed that the peace process would be incremental now that Sadat 
had passed. 
 After his visit to Israel, Carter announced his plans to cross the Jordan River to 
visit Jordan and King Hussein (Shipler, 1983a). Carter met with Hussein on March 13 
resulting in an exchange of views on international questions, according to Carter (“Carter 
Sees Hussein,” 1983). Hussein briefed Carter about Arab efforts for peace but also told 
Carter that the PLO rejected Reagan’s idea of Palestinian rule of the West Bank in 
tandem with the Jordanian government. At his press conference concluding his visit to 
Jordan, Carter attacked Israeli policy once again, stating that West Bank settlements were 
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“a direct violation of international law” and that they were “an obstacle to peace (“West 
Bank Settlements,” 1983). Carter left Jordan on March 15. 
 Carter made two more stops on his tour. First was Saudi Arabia, where he met 
with King Fahd on March 15
th
 (“Carter Visits Syria,” 1983). The last trip was to Syria 
where Carter met with President Hafez Al-Assad on March 17 (“Carter Visits Syria,” 
1983; Friedman, 1983). Carter met with Al-Assad for two hours over lunch (Friedman, 
1983). Carter publicly denounced Ronald Reagan’s claim that Syria was a puppet of the 
Soviet Union if qualifier, use “simply” because they imported missiles from the Soviets 
(Friedman, 1983, p. A4). During a tour of Damascus, Syrian onlookers shouted “Death to 
America” upon seeing Carter.  
 After Carter’s visit to the Middle East, Carter was silent on foreign affairs issues 
for several months. In June, Carter gave a speech to the environmental group Global 
Tomorrow Coalition (Biddle & Slade, 1983; Shabecoff, 1983). In the speech, Carter 
claimed that the Reagan administration deliberately abandoned environmental leadership 
(Shabecoff, 1983). This supposed abandonment included changing environmental laws to 
circumvent them (Biddle & Slade, 1983). Carter noted that Reagan has ignored many 
problems that were identified during his administration including world hunger, unequal 
distribution of natural resources, and overuse of fossil fuels. Finally, Carter attacked 
Reagan’s escalation of the arms race. Carter felt that the arms race would destroy the 
American economy. 
 In July, Carter gave a speech in Tokyo that was simulcast on US superstation 
TBS. Carter criticized United States limits on Japanese trade and defense that were 
implemented by the Reagan administration. “These kinds of decisions ought to be made 
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by Japanese officials in your country not by American politicians in Washington,” argued 
Carter during the speech (“Carter Assails Demands,” 1983, p. A2). Carter believed that 
Reagan was endangering the greatest trade relationship in the history of the United States. 
Carter also noted that Russian industrial espionage indicated that the West was far ahead 
of the Soviets.  
 In August, Carter was invited to offer his views on United States interests in 
Central America to a Presidential Commission led by Henry Kissinger (Smith, 1983). 
Carter testified on September 1
st
 with Sol Linowitz his chief advisor on Latin America 
(Ayres Jr., 1983). Carter said he desired to see a clear and consistent policy on Central 
America. Linowitz also noted that unilateral action in Latin American affairs could not 
solve the complex problems in the region. Despite Carter’s recommendations to the 
commission, Reagan had United States troops invade Grenada to rescue American 
citizens (Gwertzman, 1983). One of Reagan’s justifications was that he did not want to 
have another Iranian style crisis on his hands (Gwertzman, 1983).  
 In November, a Lebanese suicide bomber killed 210 marines stationed in 
Lebanon. This event coincided with the first major initiative of the Carter Center. Several 
officials from the Middle East and scholars of Middle Eastern affairs met (Schmidt, 
1983a; Schmidt, 1983b). Ford, who was attending the conference, and Carter issued a 
joint statement (Schmidt, 1983a). Ford and Carter felt that United States military 
retaliation was an inappropriate course of action as their attackers had not been clearly 
identified (Schmidt, 1983a). Ford felt that the Marines should not be withdrawn from 
Lebanon. Carter felt that no military action should be taken except action in defense of 
the Marines remaining in Lebanon. Reagan accused Carter of gutting the CIA. That led to 
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an intelligence failure which allowed the bombing to happen (“White House Contends 
Carter,” 1983).  
 The conference at the Carter Center was the first major event the Center hosted 
(Schmidt, 1983a; Schmidt, 1983b). The conference had officials from Syria, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the United States (Schmidt, 1983b). Israel refused to 
attend because Walid Khalid, a Harvard Professor and former PLO member, attended the 
conference. Much of the discussion was regarding building a larger Arab state coalition 
in support of the Camp David Accords. However, Faraq Al-Shar, a Syrian foreign 
minister, publicly attacked United States Middle Eastern policy. Osama el-Baz of Egypt, 
contended that without Lebanese peace there would not be a greater peace. Finally, 
Carter publicly stated that the United States would not punish Israel for non-compliance 
in regards to the Camp David Accords. The conference served as Carter’s last major 
public comment or activity in 1983 regarding foreign affairs.  
1984 
 During 1984, a presidential election year, national coverage of Carter’s activities 
lessened. On January 2, Carter and Gerald Ford issued a joint statement at the World 
Food Conference in Rome. They called on the governments of the world to work to end 
world hunger (“Around the world, A New Campaign,” 1984). Carter also visited 
Australia in early February but chose to make his visit private (“Carter in Australia,” 
1984). In May, several Carter administration officials helped Nicholas Ardito Barlettas 
win the Panamanian presidential election by 1700 votes (Brinkley & Gailey, 1984).  
 Carter was interviewed by The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution in 
October. Carter made several comments about the administration’s policies (Riding, 
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1984). Carter stated that “for the first time since Eisenhower, we made no progress on 
nuclear arms control” (Riding, 1984, p. A11). Carter also contended that “Reagan has had 
no success at all in foreign policy” (Riding, 1984, p. A11). 
 Carter travelled to several South American countries in early October. Carter 
visited Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. All were countries that he had targeted with his 
human rights based foreign policy during his presidency (Freudenheim & Giniger, 1984; 
Riding, 1984; Schell, 1984). Carter met with several leaders that were helping countries 
transition to stable civilian rule (Freundenheim & Giniger, 1984). While visiting Peru, 
Carter met with President Fernando Beluande Terry (Riding, 1984). While visiting 
Brazil, Carter met with General Joao Batista Figueinedo. He also met with leaders of the 
pro-government party and the opposition party (Riding, 1984). While in Argentina, 
Carter visited with President Raul Alfonsin (Freudenheim & Giniger, 1984).  
 In addition to meeting with leaders, Carter visited human rights leaders in the 
countries. While in Brazil, Carter met with pro-human rights Archbishop Paulo Evaristo 
Cardinal Ares (Riding, 1984). He also met with Rio de Janeiro governor Leonel Brizola 
(Riding, 1984). After those meetings, Carter stated that a clear human rights policy had 
positively impacted Brazil (Riding, 1984, p. A11). 
During the trip former Peruvian, Brazilian, and Argentine exiles met with and 
praised Carter for his actions during his presidency (Freudenheim & Giniger, 1984, p. 
4.4). Carter told the press that Reagan had abandoned his human rights foreign policy. 
Despite that, Carter said nations were still benefiting from his decision to promote human 
rights (Freudenheim & Giniger, 1984; Riding, 1984). After Carter completed his tour, 
Schell (1984, p. A27), the head of the human rights watchdog group Americas Watch, 
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declared him a hero. Carter’s human rights policy had a positive impact on American 
interests. He claimed that Reagan had taken advantage of his policies (Schell, 1984, p. 
A27). 
 After the tour of South America, Carter and Ford announced that they would host 
a symposium on the issue at the Carter Center in April of 1985 (“Nuclear Panel Planned,” 
1984). Carter, as well as other Democrats, called for the resignation of C.I.A. director 
William J. Casey on October 21. It was disclosed that the C.I.A. wrote a manual for 
Nicaraguan rebels on how to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Nicaraguan 
government (“Carter Bids C.I.A. Chief Quit,” 1984).  As election day neared, on October 
24, during a speech at Princeton University, Carter attacked Reagan’s ability to manage 
foreign policy issues. He noted that “Reagan lacks the interest” in foreign policy to serve 
as an effective negotiator for the United States (“Carter Says Reagan,” 1984, p. A25).  
 Carter was silent in the press on foreign policy issues except for an attack on 
Reagan. The attacks followed Reagan’s landslide election victory over Walter Mondale. 
At a Habitat-for-Humanity fundraiser on November 10, Carter attacked Reagan for his 
use of the military in both Lebanon and Grenada (“Carter Cites Reagan,” 1984). Carter 
was also concerned that America voted for a man who simply kept restating a message of 
“well-being” (“Carter Cites Reagan,” 1984, p. H25).  
1985 
 On January 5, it was announced that Jimmy Carter would receive the World 
Methodist Peace Prize on March 13 1985 (“World Methodist Peace Prize,” 1985). Carter 
was given the award because of his promotion of human rights, his work on arms control, 
and his contributions for Habitat For Humanity (“Carter first American,” 1985). This 
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award was important because it was the first major award Carter received after his 
presidency (“Carter first American,” 1985; “World Methodist Peace Prize,” 1985).  
 While promoting a book, Carter went on the attack against Reagan during an 
interview in April (Mohr, 1985). Carter contended that Middle East peace would be built 
on common ground between Israel and the Arab world. He pointed out that Reagan had 
failed to advance the peace process. Carter would ask the United Nations to punish Israel 
if Prime Minister Begin did not help Israel live up to the Camp David Accords. In 
addition, Carter felt that Reagan had alienated all sides in the peace process. Carter 
believed that no progress could be made in the Middle East unless the Camp David 
Accords that he had negotiated were fully implemented. 
 A day later, Carter used an upcoming nuclear arms conference as a platform to 
comment on the state of the Democratic Party. Carter believed that the future of the 
Democratic Party should not rest in the hands of Senator Edward Kennedy. He felt 
Kennedy was too liberal to be a good party leader (Gailey, 1985). Carter felt that a 
moderate, like New York Governor Mario Cuomo, would be a better choice. Carter also 
noted that Reagan should appoint a specialist to handle the Middle East peace process. 
 The Carter Center conference on nuclear arms control, hosted by Gerald Ford and 
Jimmy Carter, took place in mid-April 1985. Delegates from the Soviet Union, China, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States attended (Biddle, 1985). Much 
criticism of arms policy came from the representatives. Soviet Ambassador, Dobrynin, 
claimed that Reagan refused to negotiate with the Soviets. The Chinese delegation 
criticized the nuclear build-up of both the United States and the Soviets. Henry Kissinger 
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postulated that the Soviets and the United States were simply out of ideas on how to 
negotiate an arms freeze. 
 Carter also made several comments about the nuclear arms race and the 
conference. On April 12, Carter noted that an immediate nuclear freeze would not be 
compatible with the Soviet arms build-up (Biddle, 1985). On April 14, Carter claimed 
that the conference was developing potential treaty terms. The Soviets would never sign a 
treaty as long as Reagan pursued his Strategic Defense Initiative (including Star Wars) 
(Lewis, 1985).  
 Carter (1985) commented about the conference findings in an editorial in The 
New York Times. He felt that while both sides wanted nuclear arms control talks, negative 
comments from both governments prevented effective negotiations. Complex 
negotiations involving terms and definitions of those terms, were difficult enough without 
hostility between governments. Carter set up the conference to define terms in a calm 
environment. Carter, once again, claimed that Reagan must drop his insistence on 
pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative to extend the anti-ballistic missile treaty. Carter 
believed that arsenal reductions to around 2,000 weapons each piece would be a good 
starting point for negotiations. Carter proposed that Reagan’s push for Congressional and 
Soviet support for arms control. 
 Carter continued to make public comments about arms control throughout the 
year. In September, he again publicly stated that the pursuit of Star Wars would prevent 
arms control talks (Smith, 1985). In November, Reagan announced that he would hold a 
conference to meet with Nixon, Ford, and Carter about the issue (Gelb, 1985).  
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 On June 21, Carter publicly supported Reagan while he dealt with the hijacking of 
Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight 847 (Smothers, 1985). He believed Americans should 
“give President Reagan our full support and encouragement” during the crisis (Smothers, 
1985, p. 1.6). Leaders, according to Carter, were in a tough spot during a hostage crisis 
because they had to balance national interest with protecting lives. He conveyed that, in a 
hostage crisis, the president needs to have the sustained support of American people. 
Carter chose to speak to the press only once on the issue (Smothers, 1985).  
 In July, Carter visited Greece (“Carter meets Papandreou,” 1985). On July 13, 
Carter met with Greek Prime Minister Papandreou and went sightseeing (“Carter meets 
Papandreou,” 1985). Carter held a press conference in Greece to attack Reagan’s public 
stance against international terrorism (“Around the world; Carter faults,” 1985). He also 
assured the Greeks that the Athens airport would be removed from Reagan’s travel 
advisory list. The Reagan Administration believed the airport was a security risk. 
 In October, Carter publicly supported Reagan’s handling of the hijacking of the 
“Achille Lauro” (Hazarika, 1985). He felt it would be a mistake to extradite the hijackers 
from Italy because they would receive a fair trial there (Hazarika, 1985). Mr. and Mrs. 
Carter also took a 13 day trip to Nepal to visit Mount Everest at the end of October 
(“Carter vacationing in Nepal,” 1985). No public comments were made during this trip. 
1986 
 On January 2, Yasser Arafat said that Carter was a man of principles derived from 
“true Christian spirit (“Arafat terms Reagan,” 1986, p. A6). Carter followed up on the 
comment by starting a human right’s tour in February. He visited Venezuela, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Mexico (“Carter sees new avenues,” 1986). On the first part 
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of his trip, Carter met with Costa Rican government officials and rebels (“Carter in 
Nicaragua,” 1986). Carter also met with Sandinista government and opposition officials 
in Nicaragua on February 7 (“Carter in Nicaragua,” 1986). As a result of Carter’s visit, 
the Sandinista government released two political prisoners at his request on February 9 
(Erlick, 1986). Carter, after 12 hours of talks with Sandinista leaders, identified some 
ways to help solve the conflicts in Nicaragua. They included a request by the government 
to end aid to CONTRA rebel forces (“Carter sees new avenues,” 1990).  
 Carter continued publicly sparring with Reagan. Carter was upset with comments 
made in a March 1
st
 speech by Reagan. Reagan attacked the military record during 
Carter’s presidency (Mohr, 1986). Carter responded with harsh criticisms of Reagan’s 
knowledge of history. He criticized covert United States’s assistance of rebel groups in 
Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. He chastised Reagan for his failure to continue 
arms talks with the Soviets (Mohr, 1986). Carter argued that funding of the CONTRAS 
had failed to develop an opposition military group that could compete with the Sandinista 
government (Mohr, 1986). Reagan contended later in the month that Carter had 
misunderstood his position and that he was sorry for the disagreement (Weinraub, 1986).  
 After his visit to Latin America, the Carter Center hosted a symposium on 
developing country debt (Farnsworth, 1986). Mexico was the primary focus of the 
discussion. Finance minister Jesus Silva Herzog, Carter, and Senator Howard Baker were 
at the conference among others (Farnsworth, 1986,). Mexico lost six billion dollars from 
falling oil prices and was already paying ten billion per year in interest on a 100 billion 
dollar debt (Farnsworth, 1986). Few possible solutions were offered except for Minister 
Herzog requesting that the IMF refinance Mexico’s loans (Farnsworth, 1986).  
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 Carter traveled to Zimbabwe in early July. Carter walked out after a speech given 
on July 4 by a Zimbabwean government official. The speaker criticized the United States 
for not taking a stance against South African Apartheid (“Around the world; Carter 
faults,” 1986; “Carter leads walkout, 1986; Gwertzman, 1986a; “Zimbabwe: Ugly 
words,” 1986). Carter said that the speech “was entirely inappropriate and an insult to my 
country and me personally” (“Carter leads walkout,” 1986, p. 1.4). Carter was invited to 
Zimbabwe, because he helped the transition to Zimbabwean majority rule while he was 
president (Gwertzman, 1986a).  
 On July 9, Reagan suspended aid to Zimbabwe for 1986. Aid for 1987 was later 
cut (Clarity, 1986; Gwertzman, 1986a; Gwertzman, 1986b). Despite this, Zimbabwe 
refused to apologize publicly for the July 4 comments (“Around the world; Carter faults,” 
1986; Day, 1986; “Zimbabwe: ugly words,” 1986). Carter later postulated that he would 
not have walked out if he had known aid would be cut (“Around the world; Carter 
faults,” 1986). Carter’s actions and their impact led President Robert Mugabe to meet 
with a group of non-aligned nations in September (Gwertzman, 1986b). Despite aid 
eventually being restored, Mugabe was able to use the United States as leverage to 
increase his power base (“United States ends Zimbabwe freeze,” 1988). Mugabe 
remained in power ignoring several request for elections for the next 20 years. 
 The Carter Library opened on October 1
st
. The library held 27 million documents, 
served as a teaching center, and housed the Carter Center offices (Schmidt, 1986). Carter 
went to Brown University at the end of September to assist with the opening of an 
institute for international studies (“New foreign institute,” 1986). Carter visited 
Bangladesh with hopes of starting a philanthropic center in November (“Carter in 
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Bangladesh,” 1986). Carter also visited a refugee camp for Afghani citizens in Pakistan 
as co-chair of a group aiding health projects in the region (“Carter meets with Afghan,” 
1986).  
 The Carter Center hosted a conference for emerging democracies that had Carter, 
Gerald Ford, Argentine President Alfonsín, and Guatemalan President Cerezo in 
attendance (Chavez, 1986). As a result of the conference, Nicaraguan government 
officials announced they would release American political prisoners (Chavez, 1986). 
Carter proclaimed that Nicaragua must take real steps toward a genuine democracy for 
United States/Sandinista relationships to improve (Chavez, 1986). On December 9, 
Carter demanded that Reagan be truthful about the Iran-Contra affair (“The White House 
Crisis,” 1986).  
1987 
 Very little of Carter’s international affairs comments or activities were covered in 
1987. In March, Carter visited Israel and criticized the fact that former Prime Minister 
Begin refused to meet with him (Friedman, 1987). In October, Carter publicly criticized 
the military buildup in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war (“Carter recommends 
that Reagan,” 1987). Carter called for Congress to be notified of any imminent danger to 
troops because of the War Powers Act. He said the act was unconstitutional during his 
presidency (“Carter recommends that Reagan,” 1987). In November, Carter and Houston 
philanthropist Dominique de Menil awarded a $100,000 human rights prize to La Vicaria, 
a Roman Catholic aid group in Chile (“A foundation led by Carter,” 1987).  
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1988 
 In 1988, a presidential election year, Carter’s comments on international affairs 
were rarely covered. Carter and 2,000 other passengers were trapped in San Juan harbor 
(“Grounded ship stalls,” 1988). A cruise ship on which the Carter family was vacationing 
was blocked by a grounded cruise ship. Carter met with an advisor to PLO leader Yasser 
Arafat on August 20 in Cairo and returned to the west the next day (“Carter is reported,” 
1988). In November, Carter sent a letter to the Ayatollah Khomeini asking for the release 
of American prisoners. He acknowledged that the State Department was also working on 
the release of Iranian prisoners (Binder & Wines, 1988).  
1989 
 Vice-President Dan Quayle publicly criticized Jimmy Carter for meeting with 
rebel groups and anti-United States leaders (“Quayle chides Carter,” 1989). Quayle stated 
that, “obviously when you have a former President meeting with heads of state we don’t 
meet with, it has a chance of complicating matters” (p. A3). Quayle and Carter attended 
the inauguration of Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez together. Criticism of 
Carter also came in the form of a letter to the editor to The New York Times (Balsom, 
1989). It noted that Carter should not ask people to be sensitive to moderate Muslim 
concerns about a book written by Salman Rushdie. Rushdie’s book the Satanic Verses 
was highly critical of the Koran and Muslim culture. The Ayatollah Khomeini put a price 
on Rushdie’s head after the book was released.  
 Carter was thrust back into the international spotlight in April. The Bush 
administration was highly critical of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega (Pear, 1989a). 
Carter and Gerald Ford were drafted to lead an election observation team for the May 5 
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election between a puppet candidate of Noriega’s and an opposition candidate (Cochez, 
1989; Pear, 1989b). Cochez (1989) was prophetic with the prediction that Ford and 
Carter were too late to help an inherently corrupt election process. Carter (1993) covered 
the days following the election in detail. News reports reflected Carter’s observations. 
Carter phoned in statements that the Noriega government was taking the election by 
fraud. He reported that Panamanian soldiers stormed polling places and took the tally 
sheets (Gruson, 1989). The Carter group reported that Guillermo Endara was defeating 
Noriega candidate Carlos Duque by almost a 3 to 1 margin (Gruson, 1989; “Stern but 
steady on Panama,” 1989).  
 Upon returning to the States, Carter continued his public comments about 
Panama. Carter felt strongly that the Panama Canal Treaty signed during his presidency 
should be upheld. If the treaty was canceled, the United States would alienate every other 
nation in the hemisphere (Pear, 1989b). Carter felt that the United States should only use 
force to keep the Panama Canal open and for no other reason (Pear, 1989). Carter and 
Senator John McCain both felt that using military force to remove Noriega would be 
against US interests (Weinraub, 1989). Carter briefed President Bush in Washington, 
D.C. on May 11 (Applebome, 1989). The United States attacked Panama in December 
and forcibly removed Noriega from power.  
 Carter also made several other observations following the Panama election fiasco. 
After his White House meeting, Carter showed appreciation for Bush. He believed the 
administration was developing a bi-partisan foreign policy (Applebome, 1989). Carter 
argued that he could meet with people and governments as a United States citizen that 
government representatives could not. The Carter Center was already spending $16 
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million per year on program including health care, agricultural, African peace, and 
technological development in the developing world. Election monitoring was also a 
major focus of the Carter Center. Liberal editorial writer Dionne Jr. (1989) believed that, 
“Carter was emerging as the best former President” (p. B6). Carter seemed to be granted 
credibility by the Bush administration. 
 Carter worked, through the Carter Center, in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. In 
June, the leader of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, John Garang, came to Atlanta 
to hold talks with Carter. They discussed the long term civil war between his Christian 
group and the Muslim government in Sudan (Perlez, 1989d, p. 1.8). Garang also met with 
the State Department while visiting the United States (Perlez, 1989d, p.1.8). After 
meeting with Carter, Garang announced his group’s intention to meet with the Sudanese 
government to discuss peace. The main conflict was the Sudanese government’s 
implementation of Muslim law (“Sudan peace talks,” 1989; “Sudan rebel to meet,” 
1989).  
 In December, Carter mediated talks between Garang and the head of the Sudanese 
Government, General Omar Hassan al Bashir (“Sudanese Agree,” 1989; “Sudan peace 
talks,” 1989). Both sides agreed to allow United Nations sponsored food flights to resume 
in the country (“Sudanese agree,” 1989). Carter told reporters Garang claimed that over 
250,000 people had died in the southern Christian and tribal region of the Sudan during 
the civil war (“Sudan peace talks,” 1989). Talks collapsed on December 5 over the issue 
of Islamic Law (“Sudan peace talks,” 1989). Carter believed that neither side was 
prepared to take the steps for peace (“Sudan peace talks.” 1989).  
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 In August, Ethiopian President Mengistue Haile Marian announced that he was 
willing to meet with rebels at the Carter Center (“United States talks with Ethiopia,” 
1989). The government and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front had been at war for 
three decades. Over 500,000 people had been killed (“Carter to bring,” 1989). Both sides 
agreed that Carter was an appropriate choice to restart talks because of his concern for 
human rights and peace (“Carter to bring,” 1989). Talks had broken down in 1978, 1982, 
and 1985. Both sides hoped the end of the war would stop economic strain (“Ethiopian 
minister says,” 1989). Eritrea became part of Ethiopia in 1950 after an United Nations 
resolution. Eritreans believed that they should be independent (“Opponents in Ethiopia,” 
1989).  
 To complicate the peace talks, the Ethiopian government was also at war with the 
Tigre Peoples Liberation (TPL) army. Their main complaint against the government was 
their Marxist policy making (“2nd rebel group joins,” 1989). The TPL announced that 
they were willing to observe talks between the Eritreans and the Ethiopians if Carter was 
the mediator (“2nd rebel group joins” 1989). Five days before the talks, the Ethiopian 
government released 87 political prisoners and 820 others including three grandsons of 
the former Ethiopian emperor (Perlez, 1989a). Carter believed that ancient hostilities 
would be difficult to resolve through talks (Apple, 1989). Both sides had taken steps 
since they had both met with Carter initially in 1988. Carter believed that the Carter 
Center was in a perfect state to help all three groups. Carter Center officials could speak 
with the rebel groups while the United States negotiated only with recognized 
governments (Apple, 1989).  
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 Talks began in Ethiopia on September 7. The main topic was Eritrean 
independence. The Eritreans offered Red Sea access if they were given land in return 
(“Opponents in Ethiopian, 1989). As a result of the talks, Cuban troops left Ethiopia 
(“Cuban troops to,” 1989). Many issues were unresolved during the eight days of 
negotiations. Carter felt that some procedural issues were resolved (“Ethiopia talks make 
progress,” 1989; Schwartz, 1989). Procedurals that were not resolved would be discussed 
during another set of talks on November 18 (“Ethiopian peace talks,” 1989). Talks were 
complicated because of the ongoing civil war and conflicts in neighboring Sudan and 
Somalia (Perlez, 1989c).  
 Talks resumed in Nairobi, Kenya in November (“Ethiopia-Eritrea peace treaty,” 
1989; “Ethiopia and rebels,” 1989). Both the Ethiopian government and the Eritreans 
agreed to hold formal peace talks with Carter and former Tanzanian president Julius K. 
Nyerere as co-chairs (“Ethiopia-Eritrea peace treaty,” 1989; “Ethiopia and rebels,” 1989; 
Perlez, 1989a). There would also be a seven person international observation panel 
present. Carter was excited about the progress. Mengistu stopped conscripting citizens for 
the war. There were still problems including the war with the Tigre Peoples Liberation 
Front (Perlez, 1989a).  
 In addition to his peace negotiation activities, Carter agreed to monitor elections 
in Nicaragua in February 1990 (“Carter to monitor,” 1989; “Role likely for Carter,” 
1989). A similar group to the one that monitored the Panamanian elections sponsored by 
the Carter Center would be sent to Nicaragua (“Carter to monitor,” 1989). In September, 
Carter was concerned about Mikito Indian leaders and others who emigrated from 
Nicaragua during Sandinista rule. He felt emigrants would potentially be blocked at the 
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border when they returned to vote (Schwartz, 1989). In October, Spanish President Felipe 
Gonzalez noted that he believed Carter could successfully monitor the Nicaraguan 
election (Riding, 1989). The election would serve as a step to solving problems between 
Nicaragua and the United States. In November, Carter communicated with the Sandinista 
government and the press. The Sandinistas needed to stop smearing opposition candidates 
in the Nicaraguan press by linking them with CONTRA military violence (“Carter says 
Sandinistas,” 1989). 
 Carter made a few other statements regarding international affairs toward the end 
of the year. There was a reunion of 2,000 Carter administration officials in Washington. 
Carter criticized the international affairs policy of the Reagan administration (Tolchin, 
1989). He noted that Bush and the Carter Center had an almost perfect relationship. The 
second annual Carter-Menil Human Rights Award was given to a Jewish group and a 
Palestinian group that both monitored human rights violations in the West Bank (“Carter-
Menil Rights Award,” 1989). King (1989) chronicled Carter’s accomplishments 
following his presidency. He concluded that the Carter Center was the perfect 
organization for conflict resolution. Carter’s work to settle a dispute between the Greek 
Orthodox Church and the Turkish government came to fruition. Orthodox Mass was held 
in a 16
th
 century church that the Turks allowed the Greek Orthodox Church to restore 
(“Mass is said,” 1989).  
1990 
 Carter continued his work with Middle East peace in 1990. In January, Carter 
accused Israel of selling cluster bombs to the Marxist Ethiopian government (Sciolino, 
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1990b). Carter was quick to point the finger at Israel acknowledging that Ethiopia had the 
bombs.  
 Carter spent much of the earlier part of the year preparing to monitor elections in 
Nicaragua. While visiting Nicaragua on January 26, Carter told the Sandinista 
government to release United States backed funds to the opposition party (“Release 
opposition’s funds,” 1990). Funds approved by Congress to support the opposition party 
were being held up by United States red tape and Nicaraguan bank rules (Uhlig, 1990a). 
Nicaraguan law allowed foreign contributions as long a 50% tax was given to the 
government (Pear, 1990b). As of February 3, the government had access to 1.3 million of 
their 4.5 million. The opposition party only had access to 278,000 dollars of their 9 
million in funds supplied by the United States government (Pear, 1990b). The election 
would take place on February 27 (Uhlig, 1990c). The Sandinistas agreed to release funds 
after Carter’s visit (Pear, 1990b).  
 Another problem between the United States and Nicaragua involved a United 
States Congressional election observation team (“Nicaragua will let Congress,” 1990; 
“United States delegation on Managua,” 1990). On January 27, the Sandinistas 
announced that they had reversed their policy and were going to allow United States 
Congressional observers (“Nicaragua will let Congress,” 1990). However, on February 7, 
the Sandinistas reversed their policy again and denied many members of the 
Congressional delegation visas (Pear, 1990a; “United States delegation on Managua,” 
1990). The Sandinista government announced that they did not want an official United 
States delegation because of funding for the Contras during the Reagan administration 
(Pear, 1990b). Carter brought members of Congress with him who received visas with his 
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delegation. He publicly stated that this would be the most observed election in the history 
of the world (“United States delegation on Managua,” 1990). The election would be 
monitored by the Carter Center group, the United Nations,  and the Organization of 
American States (Pear, 1990a; Uhlig, 1990b).  
 Pre-election polling showed that the Sandinistas had huge leads (Uhlig, 1990b). 
However, on Election Day the Sandinistas were routed by a coalition of opposition 
parties (Uhlig, 1990c). Preliminary numbers were likely misleading because many 
opposition voters were returning (Uhlig, 1990b). Carter noted that the Sandinistas did 
nothing to stop the election. Ortega needed no convincing to resign. Carter praised the 
Sandinistas for their peaceful overtures (Uhlig, 1990c).  
 Carter attended a conference with Reagan and Nixon on United States-Japanese 
relations. Following the conference, Carter began another trip to the Middle East in 
March (Weisman, 1990). Carter started his trip with a visit to Syria. He met with Foreign 
Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (“Carter in Syria,” 1990). During the March 14 meeting, Syria 
announced that they were committed to freeing American hostages in Lebanon (“Carter 
in Syria,” 1990). Carter also visited Egypt on March 15 before heading to Israel (“Carter 
in Syria,” 1990).  
 Before he arrived in Jerusalem, Carter announced to the press that the United 
States plan for a separate Israel and Palestine killed Israel’s Likud party coalition 
government (“Carter in Syria,” 1990). Carter also announced that Syria was willing to 
hold peace talks with Israel (Brinkley, 1990; “Carter criticizes Israelis,” 1990). The 
change in Syria’s stance after four previous wars with Israel was necessitated by a Soviet 
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unwillingness to back the Syrians in another war (Brinkley, 1990). The Israelis ignored 
Carter’s announcement (Brinkely, 1990).  
 Carter continued his attacks on Israel during the visit (“Carter criticizes Israelis,” 
1990). During a three day sojourn Carter accused the Israeli military of shooting peaceful 
protesters, of holding over 9,000 Palestinian prisoners, and killing over 650 Palestinians 
due to excessive force (“Carter criticizes Israelis,” 1990). Carter visited the Golan 
Heights to observe how the Syrians were being treated (“Carter criticizes Israelis,” 1990). 
In addition to publicly attacking Israel, Carter announced on April 4 that he had met with 
PLO leader Yasser Arafat (“Carter meets Arafat,” 1990). Stearn (1990) noted that 
Carter’s critiques of Israel were the equivalent to treating them like a despotic nation.  
 In May, the Carter Center led another group monitoring the presidential election 
in the Dominican Republic (French, 1990b; French 1990d). Despite accusations by both 
President Balaguer and longtime rival former president Mr. Bosch, Carter said the 
election was carried out adequately and honestly (French, 1990b). Regardless, the day 
after the election on May 18, Carter visited the homes of both candidates. He met to 
discuss the next step in the election as it had been it was a tight race. Both candidates 
should have expected this as they had already run against each other five times previously 
(French, 1990d). On May 20, Carter urged that votes stop being counted so the 
observation team could make a plan to deal with fraud (“Election tally is suspended,” 
1990). Three weeks later in June, the election still was not resolved (French, 1990a). The 
Carter team failed to help the Dominicans choose a president.  
 Carter continued to deal with issues in Central America and the Caribbean 
throughout the rest of the year. Carter wrote a letter to Guatemalan President Vincicio 
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Cerezo. He demanded an investigation of the kidnapping of human rights workers from a 
group to which he had planned to award the Carter-Menil Human Rights Award (“Carter 
asks Guatemala,” 1990). Carter also agreed to monitor elections in Guyana. Guyana’s 
elections had been marred by fraud since their independence in 1966 (“Carter asks 
Guatemala,” 1990). Carter also monitored the Haitian elections in December. He 
announced that they were free of violence but that polling places were not all ready for 
voters at the start of the election (French, 1990c).  
 The Persian Gulf crisis erupted in September 1990. Initially, Carter noted that he 
believed military action against Iraq might be inevitable after the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait (“Confrontation in the Gulf,” 1990). Carter was interviewed in Time in October 
and pushed for peace talks with Saddam Hussein (“America’s best weapon,” 1990). In 
November, Carter praised Bush’s handling of the Persian Gulf crisis, urging Bush to wait 
it out and not go to war (“Mideast tensions; Carter charges,” 1990). Bush used military 
action to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait and invade Iraq in January 1991.  
1991 
 Early in 1991, Carter did little, but others were quick to recommend Carter for 
international affairs positions. Najm (1991) recommended that Carter serve as the 
impetus for change in the Middle East as a peace envoy. Stone (1991), in a letter to the 
editor to The New York Times, recommended Carter for the vacant U. N. Secretary 
General position. Not all publicity was positive. For example Rosenthal (1991) was 
highly critical of Carter’s visits to and stance on China. He felt that Carter believed that 
socialist governments were better equipped to serve their people than democracies.  
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 Carter made news for his work in international affairs later in the year. In 
September, Li Lin, a Chinese political prisoner was released at Carter’s request (Kristof, 
1991). Carter monitored elections in Zambia. Frederick Chiluba was elected to replace 
popular statesman-dictator Kenneth Kamuda (Perlez, 1989a; Perlez, 1989b). Carter noted 
that after this election on the African continent, “It will be much more difficult for the 
oppressors to keep their people oppressed…” (Perlez, 1991b, p. A14).  
1992 
 Much like other election years, very little regarding Carter’s international work 
was mentioned in the press. In October, Bill Clinton noted that he would make Carter his 
Middle East Envoy if elected (Friedman, 1992). Syria also rejected an Israeli peace 
proposal made during talks that Carter helped to establish between the two nations 
(Friedman, 1992).  
1993 
 Carter started out 1993 criticizing Clinton for placing Chelsea in a private school 
in Washington, D.C. An on again, off again feud would continue throughout Clinton’s 
presidency (Stanley, 1993). Carter believed that Clinton was inheriting as many 
international problems as any president had since Truman (Stanley, 1993). 
Carter started a vaccination program for the poor in Atlanta, comparing 
vaccination and health care in the United States to a third world country (“Carter 
announces vaccination plan,” 1993). Carter also spoke at Rice University’s 
commencement. Carter commented that despite the attention the world was giving 
Bosnia, it was not the only place in the world where ethnic cleansing was taking place 
(“Commencement; Carter, at Rice,” 1993).  
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 Carter monitored the first free presidential election in Paraguay since 1811 (when 
the country became independent) in May (Brooke, 1993a; Brooke, 1993b; “Dirty 
democracy in Paraguay,” 1993). The Carter monitoring team walked into a situation that 
had already been wrought with fraud. This included the way in which the presidential 
candidate from the ruling Colorado party was chosen (Brooke, 1993a). The Colorado 
Party, which had been in control since 1948, blocked opposition television signals, cut 
telephone lines, closed the border, and delayed the vote count for seven hours on election 
day (Brooke, 1993c). Despite problems, Carter felt the Colorado 7% victory over the 
opposition party candidate was accurate. He noted that “if the race had come within one 
or two percentage points, the fraud would have been a significant factor” (Brooke, 1993b, 
p. A3). Critics of the election process noted that Carter had stopped an election marred by 
fraud from producing inaccurate results (“Dirty democracy in Paraguay,” 1993). 
 During the rest of the year, Carter made public appearances with the president, 
brokered deals, and prepared for future action. Carter was shouted down in June during a 
speech to several human rights groups by anti-United States protesters (“Hecklers stop 
Carter,” 1993). Carter went to the Sudan in August to moderate talks between southern 
opposition and government forces (“Jimmy Carter goes to Sudan,” 1993). Carter met 
with the Kenyan president as well to discuss ongoing civil wars in Somalia and the 
Sudan. In October, Carter met with the split southern rebel faction leaders at the Carter 
Center (“Carter will mediate,” 1993). Carter also brokered a deal between General Aidid 
of Somalia and the United Nations. The United Nations investigated allegations that the 
Somali general had ambushed United Nations troops (Holmes, 1993; Lewis, 1993). The 
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United States sought an informal truce in Somalia and an investigation of the United 
Nations troop attack (Jehl, 1993). Carter accomplished half of those goals.  
 In September, Carter was invited by Clinton to attend the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
accord signing at the White House (“At White House”, 1993; Friedman, 1993; Holmes, 
1993). Yasser Arafat met with several American VIPs including Carter at the Westin 
Hotel in D.C. upon arriving on September 12 (Bradsher, 1993). While in Washington, 
Carter pitched NAFTA with President Clinton as well as other famous politicians, once in 
September and again in November (“Ex-Presidents invited,” 1993; Ifill, 1993; 
“Presidents unified in support,” 1993). A New York Times editorial praised Carter’s 
statements against NAFTA opponent Ross Perot (“Well spoken, Mr. Carter,” 1993).  
 In October, the Carter Center made initial contact with Haiti. They planned to 
work with Prime Minister Malval and Dictator General Raul Cedras to settle differences 
that could possibly lead to future elections (French, 1993). They also discussed the 
restoration of exiled leader Jean-Bernard Aristide. These initial talks set-up future 
negotiations. Carter sent a letter to Saddam Hussein in November. It was sent with letters 
from other politicians requesting that Hussein free an Oklahoma oil man, which he did 
(“Iraqis Free United States Oilman,” 1993). The man had accidentally entered Iraq from 
Kuwait illegally. 
1994 
 In May, Carter attended the two year anniversary of the Oslo accords. He gave the 
Carter-Menil award to the Norway Institute of Applied Social Science for hosting 
fourteen secret meetings between Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres in 1992 (Schmidt, 
1994). Carter noted to the press that he was embarrassed by the lack of praise Clinton 
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gave Norway during the treaty signing in 1993 (Schmidt, 1994). In June, the Emperor of 
Japan toured the United States, starting with a visit to Plains, GA to see Jimmy Carter 
(Manegold, 1994).  
 In June, Carter took the boldest step of his post presidency when he met with Kim 
Il Sung in North Korea. After the initial meeting between Kim and Carter on June 17, 
Carter called on the United States to stop sanctions against North Korea. Discussions to 
stop a potential nuclear program took place (Sanger, 1994a). After the meeting, Kim 
announced that he would allow UN inspectors to check for nuclear weapon development 
(Gordon, 1994a; Sanger, 1994a). Carter felt that a potential standoff between the United 
States and North Korea was “the reason I came over here…” (Sanger, 1994a, p. A10).  
South Korea was uncomfortable with Carter’s visit to North Korea (Sanger, 
1994a). The Clinton Administration seemed to support Carter. They announced that they 
would negotiate with North Korea if they immediately froze their nuclear weapons 
program (Gordon, 1994b). 
 However, a day later the Clinton Administration distanced themselves from 
Carter after he publicly hugged Kim and called the trip a good omen on national TV 
(Sanger, 1994b). Carter and Clinton publicly contradicted each other in the press (Sanger, 
1994b): 
- Carter told Kim the United States would quit pushing for sanctions in the United 
Nations 
- Clinton Administration officials said they had no plans to stop pushing for 
sanctions. 
 - Carter said United States officials would engage the Koreans in direct talks. 
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- Clinton Administration policy would not change unless the North Koreans froze 
their nuclear program. 
Carter stood against sanctions (Sanger, 1994d). His stance made it harder for the United 
States to push for United Nations sanctions. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who 
also worked in the State Department during the Carter Administration, was surprised by 
Carter’s comments. Carter was not asked by the White House to comment publicly 
(Sanger, 1994b). One major accomplishment from the meetings was an agreement by 
Kim Il Sung to meet with the South Korean government (Sanger, 1994b). Carter met with 
South Korean president Kim Young Sam on June 19. Kim Young Sam then agreed to set 
up a meeting with Kim Il Sung (Sanger, 1994e; “The Carter Opening,” 1994). 
After Carter left North Korea, he criticized the United States’ stance in favor of 
sanctions. Kim Il Sung continued to insist that North Korea was not building nuclear 
weapons (Sanger, 1994d). Kim Il Sung attempted to enhance his international reputation 
(Sanger, 1994d, p. 4.5). His ultimate goal was a face-to-face meeting with Clinton. 
Carter’s trip allowed Kim to create the terms for future negotiations (Sanger, 1994e, p. 
4.5). 
 Upon leaving the Korean Peninsula, Carter declared that the North Korean crisis 
was finished (Gordon, 1994a; Gordon, 1994b; Jehl, 1994b). Carter openly criticized the 
Clinton Administration. Carter noted that if he had believed sanctions could work, he 
never would have gone to North Korea (Jehl, 1994b). Carter proclaimed that a disaster 
would have happened without his visit (Jehl, 1994b, p. A3). Clinton and Administration 
officials thoroughly distanced themselves from Carter. If talks had failed, the perception 
would have been that the Carter mission failed (Gordon, 1994a; Jehl, 1994b). The Bush 
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Administration twice denied Carter a visa for the trip in 1991 (Jehl, 1994b). Carter was 
first invited by Kim in 1991 (Sciolino, 1994b). 
 In an interview on NBC, Clinton noted that hopeful signs came from the Carter 
trip. He backed away from all conditions for talks except a nuclear freeze (Jehl, 1994d). 
Clinton was committed to restarting talks. The Clinton Administration sent North Korea a 
formal letter offering to convene talks (Gordon, 1994c; Sciolino, 1994b). Clinton 
acknowledged that Carter’s role had been important (Jehl, 1994e). Clinton noted that 
Carter’s visit “is the beginning of a new stage in our efforts to pursue a non-nuclear 
Korean Peninsula” (“Finally Talks,” 1994, p. 1.22). 
Safire (1994, June 27) pointed out that Kim turned down other emissaries, 
including Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, to speak with Carter. A New York Times 
editorial (“Finally talks,” 1994) countered that Kim’s choice of Carter allowed the 
Clinton Administration to gain a foothold for negotiations with North Korea. Levine, 
(1994) in a letter to the editor, argued that Clinton should be proud of Carter’s trip. Kim 
Il Sung died in July before negotiations with Clinton could start (Sanger, 1994c). Kim 
Jong Il later sent a letter to ask Carter to moderate further talks. Carter never responded to 
the letter (Sterngold, 1994).  
 In September, Carter was involved in another United States foreign policy crisis 
when Clinton threatened to invade Haiti. Clinton sent ships and troops toward the Island 
in an attempt to force the military junta government led by General Raul Cedras to 
abdicate (Rohter, 1994b). Before invading, Clinton decided a team comprised of Carter, 
General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn should be sent to negotiate with Cedras 
(Jehl, 1994h). Critics believed using Carter to negotiate made Clinton look indecisive, 
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especially considering that Clinton had rejected Carter’s request to be a mediator merely 
one week earlier (Apple, 1994; Jehl, 1994j). Clinton later claimed that he had always 
intended to send negotiators before war broke out (Jehl, 1994g). The New York Times 
(“Jimmy Carter’s Contribution,” 1994) was quick to praise Carter noting that he was a 
useful diplomat and that he deserved to be honored. Administration officials publicly 
stated that Carter’s negotiations were the best remaining chance for peace (Jehl, 1994j).  
 On September 17, Carter, Powell, and Nunn met with Cedras (Rohter, 1994a). 
Initially, Carter’s group was not welcomed. Aristide supporters were anxious about the 
United States military presence (Rohter, 1994a). Carter was vital to any negotiations 
because he had already made contact with Haitian officials (Jehl, 1994g). The Cedras 
junta government was interested in negotiating only with Carter. Cedras agreed to step 
down and turn over power to the Aristide Government on October 15. Haitian 
government officials also decided to allow the American military to occupy the country 
during the transition period (Jehl, 1994i).  
 Upon returning home, the Carter group met with Clinton and declared the Haiti 
mission a success (“Mission to Haiti,” 1994; Wines, 1994). Both Carter and Clinton 
praised each other (“Mission to Haiti,” 1994). Despite the glad handling, Carter and 
Clinton had another public media dispute. They disagreed on whether or not Junta leaders 
should be exiled (Wines, 1994). Carter noted, in a CNN interview, that, “a serious 
violation of inherent human rights for a citizen to be forced into exile” (Wines, 1994, p. 
A1). Carter called Mrs. Cedras a hero (Bragg, 1994; Orenstein, 1994). He even invited 
General Cedras to teach Sunday school at his church (Orenstein, 1994). Clinton’s 
approval ratings rose during occupation (Kagay, 1994).  
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 Dowd (1994) interviewed Carter and disclosed that he was unhappy with Clinton 
Administration policies. He felt mistreated by the administration. Carter was unhappy 
with Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He felt that their dysfunctional relationship 
caused tensions with the Administration. Carter was concerned by the perception that he 
was too soft on dictators. He felt that dictators were often vilified by the press and their 
positions were misunderstood. Carter still thought that the Saddam Hussein Government 
could be negotiated with. Carter also told a story of visiting the Cedras home and 
bouncing the general’s son on his knee. Later in the week, Carter criticized the State 
Department for opposing the Haitian negotiations. Carter enraged Administration 
officials when he said he was ashamed of the economic embargo on Haiti (Sciolino, 
1994c).  
 After Carter’s public rant, Christopher and Carter had a friendly personal meeting 
in Plains, GA. Christopher praised Carter for his accomplishments (“Christopher, Carter,” 
1994). The meeting seemed to ease tensions for the short term. However, in mid-October, 
Norman Schwarzkopf postulated that Saddam Hussein was stirring up problems in the 
Gulf in order to get Carter as a mediator. With Carter, he could negotiate on his own 
terms like Kim Il Sung had (“Threats in Gulf,” 1994). Carter left the Haiti situation both 
praised and criticized for his efforts. 
 The next crisis into which Carter inserted himself was the Bosnian civil war. 
Carter publicly said that he would visit Bosnian Serbs. However, Bosnians had not met 
initial agreements to allow United Nations convoys and peace keepers into the country 
(Jehl, 1994c; Sudetic, 1994). Carter serving as a mediator made everyone nervous 
including United Nations officials, NATO officials, the Clinton Administration, and other 
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European countries impacted by the conflict (Sciolino, 1994a). Boutros Boutros Ghali 
felt that sending Carter to the region sent a mixed message (Sciolino, 1994a).  
 On December 16, Bosnian Serbs opened the Sarajevo airport and allowed the 
United Nations to enter the country (Cohen, 1994f). Once the Bosnian Serbs had met his 
terms, Carter agreed to meet with them (Cohen, 1994d, Jehl, 1994a). Carter also met with 
the Croatians and Serbian governments (Jehl, 1994a). Bosnian Serbs had taken 70% of 
Bosnia. Carter had no mandate to negotiate any terms besides the 51% Muslim, 49% 
Serbian split proposed by the United Nations (Cohen, 1994c). The Bosnian Serbs hoped 
that Carter could change United States policy. He assured them publicly that he had no 
authority to do so (Cohen, 1994f).  
 Carter, after meeting with Bosnian Serb President Dr. Karadzic, announced to the 
media that a cease fire had been brokered (Cohen, 1994g; Jehl, 1994k; Kagan, 1994). It 
was believed the cease fire was of little value because fighting had been largely stalled by 
the harsh December winter in the Balkans (Cohen, 1994; Kagan, 1994; Kinzer, 1994). 
Carter also infuriated Muslim Bosnians with his visit. He commented that, “the American 
public has heard primarily one side of the story” (Cohen, 1994g, p. A1). The Clinton 
Administration noted that “positive vibrations” came from the visit. White House press 
secretary DeDe Myers told the press that if Carter opened doors the trip would be 
worthwhile (Jehl, 1994l, p. A11).  
 The treaty was signed by the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims (“A little help,” 
1994; Cohen, 1994b; Jehl, 1994l). An unnamed official from the Clinton Administration 
said, “I don’t think Carter has pulled anything out of his hat” (Jehl, 1994l, p. A14). The 
cease fire agreement was the latest of 30 short cease fires (Cohen, 1994b). The United 
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Nations was concerned that Carter glossed over the human rights concerns they had with 
the Bosnian Serbs (Cohen, 1994e). Finally, even though fighting had stopped for the 
short term, Dr. Karadzic was already taking advantage of his international press 
exposure. He reinterpreted the terms of the Carter agreement (“A Little Help,” 1994). In 
early 1995, Carter would offer to return to Bosnia. After the winter had ended there was 
no interest in bringing Carter back to negotiate another cease fire (“Carter Willing to 
Return,” 1995) 
1995 
 In February, Carter returned to Haiti to receive an honorary degree (Rohter, 
1995b). No government officials met with Carter at the airport. Anti-Carter graffiti was 
on city walls and buildings. Carter had a brief meeting with President Aristide after 
finding his own way to his office (Rohter, 1995b). Carter made it clear that he was 
willing to serve as a mediator to work out election rules (Rohter, 1995a). Haitian 
government officials were concerned about Carter serving as a mediator. They felt that, 
after his support for Cedras, he was interested in uniting opposition parties against the 
Aristide government (Rohter, 1995a).  
 Concern about Carter’s influence increased when Aristide announced that he 
would not campaign for his own party (“World News Briefs, Ex-Military Leader,” 1995). 
The message was so confusing to Haitians that Pastor (1995), a Carter Center 
representative, noted that Aristide’s decision was his own. It had not been solicited by 
Carter during their meeting. The Carter Center sent an election monitoring team led by 
Pastor. He criticized the government for widespread fraud. The Carter Center team felt 
that the Clinton Administration should not sponsor any further elections conducted by the 
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Aristide government (Greenhouse, 1995). A member of a Haitian peace-keeping group, 
in a letter to the editor to The New York Times, accused Carter and the Carter Center of 
undercutting the Aristide government (Driver, 1995). Carter and the Carter Center were 
unable to help promote election reform and long term peace in Haiti. 
 Carter continued long term efforts for peace in Africa. In March, General 
Olysegun Obasanjo was freed by Nigerian officials at Carter’s request (“World News 
Briefs, Ex-Military Leader,” 1995). The General was accused of plotting to overthrow 
Nigerian dictator Obacha. Carter also agreed to convene a conference to discuss refugee 
problems in Rwanda and Burundi. An ongoing conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnic groups had led to the crisis (Lorch, 1995; “The U.N. at 50; Carter,” 1995). There 
were over 800,000 Hutus in Zaire that fled Rwanda when Tutsis took over the 
government. Zaire planned to forcibly remove refugees December 31
st
 (Lorch, 1995). 
Carter met with representatives from Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda and 
set up an agreement to allow United Nations peace keepers to stay in the area. They 
created a time table that allowed approximately 1.8 million refugees to return to their 
own country (Jehl, 1995).  
In November, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. Carter attended his 
funeral along with George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and other United States dignitaries 
(Cowell, 1995; Mitchell, 1995). 
1996 
 Carter attended meetings with the countries of east central Africa to attempt to 
work out a solution to the continuing Hutu-Tutsi war and refugee crisis (Vance & 
Hamburg, 1996). Carter and Carter Center officials monitored the Dominican Republic 
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elections in July. Leonel Fernandez Regna, a 42-year-old lawyer from a new centrist 
party, won (“A New Dominican President,” 1996).  
Though Carter continued his Carter Center work, Carter and President Clinton’s 
relationship was broken. Brinkley (1996) noted that Carter and Clinton did not get along 
despite Carter’s many accomplishments. Carter was even excluded from the 1996 
Democratic National Convention (Brinkley, 1996). 
1997 
 In March, Carter met with Yasser Arafat in Georgia (MacFarquhar, 1997). Carter 
and the Clinton Administration also took steps to improve their relationship. In May, 
Madeline Albright met with Clinton (Bennet, 1997). Carter was invited to brief Clinton 
before a Latin American trip. It was believed that Albright replacing Christopher helped 
to thaw out the cold relationship between Clinton and Carter (Bennet, 1997).  
 Carter monitored two elections during the year. The first was in Liberia in July 
(McNeil Jr., 1997a; McNeil Jr., 1997b). Despite the fact that he had been a dictator since 
1989, Charles Taylor won with 64% of the vote. Voter turnout was over 85% (McNeil, 
Jr., 1997a). Carter also monitored elections in Jamaica in December with General Colin 
Powell, and Evander Holyfield (“Jamaica Governing Party,” 1997; Rohter, 1997).  
 In August, Carter (1997) wrote an editorial on Chinese progress for The New York 
Times that prompted praise and criticism. Carter made two controversial claims (1) that 
the Christian Church made great strides in China and (2) that Chinese leaders had been 
promoting significant democratic reforms (Carter, 1997, p. 4.15). Rosenthal (1997) and 
Bauer and Shea (1997) believed that China was much tougher on Christians than Carter 
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led the public to believe. Chen (1997) felt that China’s consistent crackdowns on pro-
democracy groups proved Carter’s statement wrong.  
1998 
 Carter (1998), in a letter to the editor in The New York Times, argued that a United 
Nations war crimes court is something that United States citizens and soldiers should not 
fear. Carter wanted the United States to embrace the court and acknowledge its 
jurisdiction. Carter urged an inquiry into Clinton’s bombing of a Sudanese 
pharmaceutical plant. It was originally purported to be a factory for developing chemical 
weapons linked to Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (“Carter Urges Inquiry,” 1998). In 
October, Carter visited a Chinese gymnast who was paralyzed in a fall during the 
Goodwill Games (Litsky, 1998). Carter was awarded a United Nations human rights 
award in December. He received the award for his work around the world but did not 
attend the ceremony. He was occupied monitoring the election in Venezuela (Crossette, 
1998).  
1999 
 On March 30, Carter was notified by the Clinton Administration of impending air 
strikes in Bosnia (Seelye, 1999). Carter (1999) wrote a scathing editorial criticizing 
United States unilateral action. He argued that the problems could only be solved through 
cooperation with groups like the United Nations. Carter opposed using a United Nations 
War Crimes Tribunal to try Serbian leaders (Ferencz, 1999). Despite his continued 
criticism of United States action, Clinton awarded Carter and his wife the Presidential 
Medal of Freedom in August (Henneberger, 1999).  
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 In December, Carter was chosen to hand over the Panama Canal (Clymer, 1999b; 
Clymer, 1999a; Gonzalez, 1999a; Gonzalez, 1999b). Carter was asked after Clinton, 
Gore, and Albright all declined attend (Clymer, 1999b). The Panamanian foreign minister 
believed that sending Carter showed a lack of respect for the region. Panamanian 
president Mirega Moscoso tried to save face by noting that she was pleased to welcome 
Carter (Gonzalez, 1999a). Carter served as the United States representative signing a 
document that stated the United States intended to honor the treaty to hand over the canal 
(Clymer, 1999a; Gonzales, 1999a). Maushard (1999) believed that Carter’s presence in 
Panama was a reminder of the major accomplishment Carter had achieved during his 
presidency. The Canal was officially turned over on January 1, 2000. The Panamanians 
shouted “the Canal is ours!” (“To Cheers, Panama,” 2000, A17). 
2000 
 In February, the Carter Center criticized Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori for 
not taking proper steps to ensure fair and fraud-free elections (“Carter Center Criticizes 
Peru’s,” 2000). At the end of the Elian Gonzalez debacle in April, Carter and Ford both 
publicly stated that decency demanded that the young Cuban should have been returned 
to his father sooner (“A Cuban Father,” 2000). In May, Carter, Ford, Gore and Clinton 
joined forces to lobby for the passage of a bill which would normalize relations with 
China (Schmitt, 2000; Seelye, 2000). Carter felt that “there is no doubt in my mind that a 
negative vote on this issue in the congress will be a serious setback and impediment to 
the further democratization, freedom, and human rights in China” (Schmitt, 2000, p. 
A14). 
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 During the second half of the year, Carter observed what he called the most fraud-
free election in the world in Mexico (Fuentes-Berain, 2000). Carter’s absence from 
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks was noticed in letters to the editor (Berger, 2000; 
Escobales Jr., 2000). Carter was invited back to the Democratic National Convention. 
Observers noted that his relationship with Gore was much better than his relationship 
with Clinton (Weinraub & Bumiller, 2000). Carter demanded, in September, that 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard should acknowledge a United Nations human 
rights monitoring report (Carter, 2000). Prime Minister Howard believed that the United 
Nations had no right to interfere in Australian domestic affairs. Finally, in October, 
Carter attended the funeral for Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (Onishi, 2000).  
2001 
 Clinton, upon leaving office, expressed a desire to emulate Carter’s post-
presidential model (Dowd, 2001). In March, Carter (2001a) criticized the Canadian 
government for unfairly subsidizing the timber industry. Canadian officials responded 
quickly. Ambassador to the United States Kergin (2001) argued that Carter’s facts were 
inaccurate. The Canadian government did not subsidize the timber industry. Canadian 
Minister of Natural Resources Snoebelen (2001) argued that any trade off for public land 
ownership was compensated for in the cost that went to enforcing far tougher Canadian 
environmental standards.  
 In July, Carter told the press that he was disappointed with everything that George 
W. Bush was doing. Specifically, Bush was not demanding the removal of Israeli 
settlements from the West Bank (Sack, 2001). Later in the month, Carter and Ford 
recommended that the United States election system be completely overhauled (Seelye, 
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2001). Carter visited Bangladesh on August 3
rd
 to help them prepare for elections 
(Bearak, 2001). After 9/11, Carter and Ford both pledged their support to George W. 
Bush (Berke, 2001). In November, Carter monitored an election in Nicaragua. Enrique 
Balkans defeated Daniel Ortega (Gonzalez, 2001). 
2002 
 Carter was back in the headlines again in March. The Bush Administration 
considered a request to allow Carter to visit Cuba (Marquis, 2002a). Carter was invited 
by Castro to visit Cuba at Pierre Trudeau’s funeral in 2001 (Marquis, 2002a; Marquis, 
2002c). Bush approved the Carter trip in early April. Carter was allowed to bring a small 
delegation (Marquis, 2002c). A group called Project Varela led a successful campaign to 
get some electoral reform on the ballot in Cuba. They hoped that a Carter visit would 
bolster their efforts (Gonzalez, 2002h; Gonzalez, 2002d; Gonzalez, 2002g). 
Castro appeared to be making an end run around the Bush Administration by 
inviting Carter. He criticized the Cuban embargo (Marquis, 2002c). At the bare 
minimum, Castro’s image would be enhanced by appearing with Carter (Gonzales, 
2002a). Bush wanted Carter to push for democratic reform. He had the State Department 
brief Carter before his visit (Gonzalez, 2002h; Marquis, 2002a). Carter, however, 
maintained that he was visiting as a private citizen pushing no one’s agenda (Gonzales, 
2002a).  
 Carter arrived in Cuba on May 12 and immediately found himself in a sticky 
situation (Gonzalez, 2002e). Future United Nations Ambassador John Bolton had 
previously accused Castro of developing biological weapons (Gonzalez, 2002b). Carter 
let it be known that he wanted to inspect the weapons facility (Gonzalez, 2002e). After 
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inspecting the facility, Carter made it clear that he believed that Cubans were not 
producing biological weapons (Gonzalez, 2002b). Carter stated that the Administration 
had never mentioned that Cuba had manufactured biological weapons (Gonzalez, 2002b). 
 Castro was quick to praise Carter for his human rights efforts around the world 
(Gonzalez, 2002e). Carter spoke at Havana University. The address was broadcast on 
Cuban television and printed in the state paper without any edits (Gonzalez, 2002a; 
Gonzalez, 2002j). In the speech, Carter called for an end to the United States embargo. 
He chastised Castro for maintaining a one party government. He also noted that the 
United States had problems as well, such as the lack of health care for the poor 
(Gonzalez, 2002a). 
Even though Carter openly chastised the Castro government, Castro allowed 
Carter to speak with members of the anti-government group Project Varela (Gonzalez, 
2002f; Gonzales, 2002j). Carter spoke out against United States support for opposition 
parties (Gonzales, 2002c). At the same time, Carter was visiting Cuba, Bush spoke to a 
group in Miami at a fundraiser. Bush was against ending the embargo (Marquis, 2002b). 
On May 21, Carter went to the White House to discuss the trip with Bush (“President and 
Carter,” 2002).  
 In November, the Nobel Committee announced that Carter would receive the 
Nobel Peace Prize (Gettleman, 2002; “Nobel Achievements,” 2002; Riding, 2002; “The 
Nobel Award,” 2002). The Committee gave him the Award because “Carter has stood by 
the principles that conflicts must as far as possible be resolved through mediation and 
international cooperation based on international law, respect for human rights and 
economic development” (“The Nobel Award,” 2002). The selection of Carter was 
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controversial. When he accepted the Award, he took jabs at Bush’s Iraq policy (Bruni, 
2002b). Berge, the chair of the prize Committee, told the press that the choice of Carter 
was a public statement against the Bush Iraq policy (Bruni, 2002a).  
 Carter (2002c), after gaining publicity from the Nobel announcement, wrote an 
editorial that criticized the Bush Administration policy toward North Korea. Carter 
(2002c) felt that Bush’s lack of engagement was hurting the relationship with the country 
and encouraging them to develop weapons. Carter (2002c) also believed that the 
framework for engagement had been set-up in 1994. Grandsen, (2002) in a letter to the 
editor, argued that Carter ignored options like deterrence. Kim Jong Il was quick to take 
advantage of Carter’s public statement. He let the world know that his nuclear program 
was open to inspection and negotiation (Shenon, 2002).  
2003 
 In January, Carter revisited the North Korean issue (Shenon, 2003). Carter 
believed that the North Koreans had a sincere desire to normalize relations with the 
United States (Shenon, 2003). Carter offered his services as a negotiator (Shenon, 2003). 
In September, Carter spoke in Tokyo labeling the North Korean nuclear standoff the 
world’s greatest threat (Brooke, 2003). Carter made it clear that he had no intention of 
making a repeat trip to North Korea (Brooke, 2003). Chae (2003) believed that Kim Jong 
Il wanted no negotiations and needed an outside threat to cement his power base.  
 Later in the month, Carter turned his efforts to Venezuela. He attempted to settle a 
dispute between the Hugo Chavez government and striking opposition party workers 
(“Shooting Kills One,” 2003; Thompson, 2003). Carter offered two proposed solutions to 
end the strike. One was a constitutional amendment to shorten the presidential term so a 
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new presidential election could be held. The second was a recall vote that allowed the 
people of Venezuela to decide on whether or not they wanted Chavez to stay in office 
(Thompson, 2003). Both a New York Times editorial (“Preserving Democracy in 
Venezuela,” 2003) and Colin Powell (Dao & Forero, 2003) believed that the 
Venezuelan’s best chance for peace was choosing one of Carter’s proposals. The recall 
proposal was chosen by the Venezuelans (Forero, 2003, January 30). Voting was not to 
take place until August 2004. 
2004 
 In August, the Carter Center and the Organization of American States monitored 
the recall election in Venezuela in August (Forero, 2004a). Carter certified the election 
results. The Bush Administration accepted the fact that Chavez had won (Forero, 2004a). 
After demanding an audit of the vote, the opposition said that corruption was so bad that 
the audit would not solve problems (Forero, 2004b). Carter and the OAS planned to 
continue with the audit. They argued that any major irregularities would be found; none 
were (Forero, 2004b).  
 During the year, Carter observed two other elections. In July, Carter monitored 
elections in Indonesia. He was satisfied that they had been fair (“Carter, in Jakarta,” 
2004). In December, Carter observed elections in Mozambique. He said that the 
surprising win by the governing party had happened in a fair and transparent election 
(Wines, 2004). Lastly, in an editorial, the day after Yasser Arafat’s death, Carter (2004) 
postulated that the Israelis would impose their will on the Palestinian people. He believed 
the Palestinians would not have a strong leader.  
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2005 
 In 2005, not much was covered about Carter’s international work. Carter 
monitored the Palestinian elections in January (Myre, 2005). Israel communicated 
through Carter and the Carter Center. They agreed not to interfere with the elections as 
long as there was peace (Myre, 2005). Abbas was elected the Palestinian leader. 
2006 
 Carter spent a lot of time on his book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (2006). The 
book was controversial. In the book, Carter claimed that the Israeli Government stifled 
debate about the Israel-Palestine issue in the United States media, committed human 
rights violations, and only released pro-Israeli news (Bosman, 2006a). Carter met with a 
group of Rabbis while visiting Arizona. The rabbis proclaimed that the meeting was not 
conciliatory (Bosman, 2006a; Kleinberg, 2006).  
Not everyone was critical of Carter, Glazer (2006) and Roy (2006) both felt that 
Carter’s criticisms were fair. Carter was not acting in an anti-Semitic way. Despite some 
individual’s praise of the book as being fair, controversy continued to surround the book. 
 Carter felt the need to defend the book in a 1000-word letter addressed to the 
Jewish community (Bosman, 2006b). Kenneth Stein, a Carter Center adviser, resigned 
saying that the book was full of factual errors and copied material (Bosman, 2006a). 
Fourteen members of the Carter Center advisory board resigned in January 2007 
(Belluck, 2007; Carter, 2007b; Goodman, 2007). Book reviews criticized the book 
(Bronner, 2007). The Anti-Defamation League ran advertisements criticizing Carter and 
the book (Goodman, 2007). The purpose of the ads was to criticize Carter for adding to 
conspiracy theories and myths that paint Jews in a bad light (Foxman, 2007).  
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2007 
 In addition to dealing with the book, Carter also had the unhappy occasion of 
attending the funeral of Gerald Ford. Ford had teamed up with Carter publicly on several 
occasions after his presidency (Kornblut & Broder, 2007). In February, Carter visited 
Africa on a four country tour. He coordinated efforts for his Guinea worm eradication 
project (Kristof, 2007b; Kristof, 2007a). Carter also took a shot at Bush, noting that he 
was winning his wars (Kristof, 2007a).  
 In May, Carter took more shots at Bush, calling him “the worst President in 
history (“Carter Criticizes Bush,” 2007). Carter also postulated that Bush had reversed 
American values. He said Bush was making pre-emptive war a United States foreign 
policy norm. He accused Tony Blair of being subservient to Bush (“Carter Criticized 
Bush,” 2007). 
Carter’s outbursts prompted comments in the press on Carter’s presidency about 
the way he alienated everyone (Moyar, 2007). Carter took back his comments about the 
administration on The Today Show (Leibovich, 2007). He said that they were “careless 
and misinterpreted” (Leibovich, 2007, p. A15). Carter also toured the United States in 
October. He promoted a new book that discussed his peace and anti-disease efforts 
(Cohen, 2007). 
2008 
 Carter resumed international activities in April of 2008. He was responding to a 
crisis in the Gaza Strip where over 20 Palestinians and Israelis were killed when fighting 
erupted (Kershner & El-Kodary, 2008). Carter agreed to meet with members of Hamas in 
the Gaza Strip to attempt to negotiate an end to the violence (Kershner, 2008a). Carter 
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met with Hamas despite protest from Israeli government officials and the Bush 
administration (Worth, 2008). During two meetings, one in Cairo and one in Damascus 
on April 18
th
 and 19
th
, Carter requested that Hamas and the Palestinians halt rocket 
attacks on Israel (Kershner, 2008b; Worth 2008). 
 Carter also attempted to use the meetings to open a dialogue for long term peace. 
Carter felt that he made progress in the meetings getting Hamas to acknowledge a two 
state solution (Bronner, 2008a). Despite opposition from Israel and the United States, 
Carter stated that “the problem is not that I met with Hamas in Syria. The problem is that 
Israel and the United States refuse to meet these people” (Bronner, 2008a, p. A12). The 
Bush Administration continued to criticize Carter over the next week, prompting Carter 
to tell the media that the Bush Administration had never counseled him not to meet with 
Hamas.  
 Carter (2008b) authored a scathing editorial entitled “Pariah Diplomacy” that was 
published in The New York Times. Carter (2008, p. A23) stated that, “A 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE (sic.) Washington policy in recent years has been to boycott 
and punish political factions or governments that refuse to accept United States mandates. 
This policy makes difficult the possibility that such leaders moderate their policies” (p. 
A23). Carter cited Washington’s inability to negotiate with Maoists in Nepal and Hamas 
as examples of bad policy that did not promote peace. Despite the criticism of the 
administration, Bush was not willing to criticize Carter. However, Bush did continue to 
criticize Hamas, complaining that they were an obstacle to Middle East peace (Myers, 
2008).  
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 In May, Carter issued a strange comment that did not fit with his normal 
promotion of human rights policies. Carter was asked at a news conference on May 26
th
 
in Wales, “how a future president should deal with the Iranian nuclear threat” (“Israel: 
Carter offers details”, 2008, p. A8). Carter, while listing the nuclear capabilities of 
several nations, said that Israel had around 150 nuclear weapons. This was a departure 
from a long standing policy of both Israel and the United States not to publicly admit the 
existence of an Israeli nuclear arsenal.  
 In June, Carter was successful in a long term project. A letter was released by 
Hamas leader, Khaled Mashal, from Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit to his family (Kershner, 
2008c). Carter was also recognized for the significant role he played in changing the 
image of Hamas from a terrorist organization to a legitimate party in Palestine (Bronner, 
2008c). 
 In November, Carter attempted to make a trip to Zimbabwe with Kofi Annan and 
other dignitaries to assess the living conditions of the populace and the viability of the 
power-sharing government. Despite being told by an envoy in Washington, D.C. that he 
would not be granted a visa, he and the group went to Zimbabwe anyway, expecting a 
visa to be issued at the airport in Johannesburg, South Africa (Dugger, 2008a). However, 
Carter and the group were denied entry into Zimbabwe by President Robert Mugabe. A 
New York Times editorial noted that Mugabe had a long term contempt for international 
opinion and that had led to his decision to deny Carter entry (“Has South Africa”, 2008). 
Carter was critical of Mugabe’s decision to reject help arguing that, “…the situation in 
Zimbabwe ‘may implode or collapse altogether.’” (Dugger, 2008b, p. A8).  
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2009 
 Carter returned to the Gaza Strip to meet with the Hamas government in June. 
Carter held a joint press conference on June 16, 2009 (El-Khodary & Kershner, 2009). 
Carter once again continued to emphasize the idea that he was in Gaza as a private 
citizen, but following a presidential change in the United States, he would write reports to 
the Obama administration about his experience. Carter also expressed displeasure with 
the bombing and economic strife in the Gaza Strip. Carter continued to express his desire 
for the Hamas government to be recognized by Israel so the process for peace could be 
restarted.  
 Carter attended two funerals in August and September. The first was for Ted 
Kennedy at the end of August (Barry, 2009). While Kennedy and Carter were not close, 
Carter attended the funeral with Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In mid-September, 
one of Carter’s closest friends and former press secretary Jody Powell died (Stout, 2009). 
Carter released a statement saying, “Jody was beside me in every decision I made as a 
candidate, governor and president, and I could always depend on his advice and counsel 
being candid and direct, I will miss him dearly” (Stout, 2009, p. B17). While Kennedy 
was a noted critic of Carter, Powell was one of his greatest supporters.  
 In December, Carter apologized for any comments that might have upset Jews 
within his 2006 book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (“Carter apologizes to Jews”, 
2009). Carter offered a prayer on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement. In a letter 
sent to the Jewish wire service, JTA, Carter stated, “We must not permit criticisms for 
improvements to stigmatize Israel” (“Carter apologizes to Jews, 2009, p. A13). Carter 
ended the decade continuing to fight for one of major life goals, Middle East peace.   
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS SPEECHES BETWEEN 2000-2009 
Speech Title Date Location 
1 President Carter's Speech at 
the International Symposium 
on Villager Self-Government 
and the Development of Rural 
Society in China 
9/3/2001 Beijing, China 
2 The United States and China 
A President's Perspective 
5/6/2002 Stanford 
University 
3 Remarks by Former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter at the 
University of Havana, Cuba 
5/14/2002 Havana, Cuba 
4 2002 Nobel Peace Lecture: 
The Complete Text 
12/10/2002 Oslo, Norway 
5 President Carter's Remarks to 
Georgia State Legislature 
4/8/2003 Atlanta, GA 
6 President Carter Delivers 
Speech to Beijing (Peking) 
University 
9/9/2003 Beijing, China 
7 Camp David Accords:  Jimmy 
Carter Reflects 25 Years Later 
9/17/2003 Washington, DC 
8 Geneva Initiative Public 
Commitment Event: Remarks 
by Former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter 
9/1/2003 Atlanta, GA 
9 Speech to the Joint Session of 
Congress of Bolivia by 
Former U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter 
12/18/2003 La Paz, Bolivia 
10 President Carter Delivers 
Keynote Speech to OAS 
Lecture Series of the 
Americas 
1/25/2005 Washington, DC 
11 Remarks on Middle East 
Peace By Former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter 
1/23/2006 Israel 
12 Jimmy Carter on Middle East 
Peace: Council on Foreign 
Relations Speech Calls for 
Renewed Commitment to 
Justice for Palestinians, 
Israelis 
3/2/2006 New York, NY 
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13 Opening Remarks by Former 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter 
to the 2006 Human Rights 
Defenders Policy Forum 
5/23/2006 Atlanta, GA 
14 Former U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter's Remarks at the 
Funeral Service for President 
Gerald R. Ford 
1/3/2007 Grand Rapids, MI 
15 Remarks by Former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter at 
Brandeis University 
1/23/2007 Waltham, MA 
16 Human Rights Speech 6/19/2007 Dublin, Ireland 
17 Peace With Justice in the 
Middle East 
6/21/2007 Oxford, United 
Kingdom 
18 Jimmy Carter Receives First 
Albert Schweitzer 
Humanitarian Award 
9/26/2007 Hamden, CT 
19 Former U.S. President and 
Carter Center Co-Founder 
Jimmy Carter's Address to 
Nepal's Parliament 
11/23/2007 Katmandu, Nepal 
20 Remarks by Former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter: 2008 
Skoll World Forum Awards 
Ceremony 
3/27/2008 Oxford, United 
Kingdom 
21 Remarks by Former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter at the 
LixXiannian Library in 
Hong'an, China 
1/14/2009 Hong'an, China 
22 New Beginnings: Living 
Together in the 21st Century 
Remarks by Jimmy Carter at 
FLACSO University, Quito 
Ecuador 
4/29/2009 Quito, Exuador 
23 Speech to the United Nations 
Relief Works Agency's 
Human Rights Graduation in 
Gaza 
6/16/2009 Gaza Strip, 
Palestine 
24 Address by Former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter: 
Mahatma Gandhi Global 
Nonviolence Award 
9/21/2009 Harrisonburg, VA 
25 Speech by Jimmy Carter to 
the Parliament of the World's 
Religions 
12/3/2009 Melbourne, 
Australia / from 
Atlanta, GA 
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